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PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION

ON FIRES, FLOODS, AND FEDERALISM
Andrew Hammond*
111 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2023)
ABSTRACT
In the United States, law condemns poor people to their fates in states. Where
Americans live continues to dictate whether they can access cash, food, and
medical assistance. What’s more, immigrants, territorial residents, and tribal
members encounter deteriorated corners of the American welfare state.
Nonetheless, despite repeated retrenchment efforts, this patchwork of programs has
proven remarkably resilient. Yet, the ability of the United States to meet its people’s
most basic needs now faces an unprecedented challenge: climate change. As
extreme weather events like wildfires and hurricanes become more frequent and
more intense, these climate-fueled disasters will displace and impoverish more
people. How can the United States adapt its welfare programs to assist Americans
in the face of this threat?
This Article maps that uncharted territory. It contextualizes the climate crisis
in our scholarly understanding of the American welfare state. It then canvasses the
myriad disaster provisions in each major welfare program. Equipped with an
understanding of the status quo, the Article proceeds to evaluate how federal law
has fared, amid the recent spate of fires and floods. The Article attends to the role
of Congress, weakened as it is by increased polarization and diminished capacity,
and how the resulting delays and distortions in emergency relief have hampered
the governmental response. The Article then brings state and local government into
focus, and in doing so, demonstrates how assistance often excludes the most
vulnerable Americans. The Article also extracts lessons from the pandemic
response for climate adaptation of public benefits. The Article concludes with an
agenda for how to adapt welfare programs to meet the climate crisis. That agenda
starts and ends with the federal government, but it includes policies states,
territories, and tribes could implement if Congress and federal agencies do nothing
or not enough. The Article repurposes what we know about how the American
welfare state functions now to inform what federal, state, and local government
should do next.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Four and a half years ago, three Category 4 hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and
Maria—made landfall in the United States in less than a month. Before that, only
one such powerful storm had hit the continental United States in a single season.
The 2017 storms were among the five most destructive in American history.1 After
Harvey, nearly 800,000 Texans had to leave their homes because of significant
flooding. Before Irma, government officials ordered the evacuation of nearly seven
million Floridians. In Maria’s wake, no one in Puerto Rico had electricity for nearly
two months, and power outages continued for six more. A few months later, several
wildfires ravaged California, five of which were the most destructive in the Golden
State’s history. Combined, the 2017 climate-fueled disasters threatened the lives
and livelihoods of 47 million Americans.2
This kind of consistent, continent-wide devastation of the United States
promises to be the new normal.3 And it will only get worse.4 The climate crisis
demands adaptation.5 Every corner of our society, and consequently every field of
law, will face different challenges from the climate crisis. This Article pursues that
adaptation analysis for one area—namely, public benefits.6 The pressure on all
1
FEMA, 2017 HURRICANE SEASON FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1 fig.3 (July 12, 2018),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-actionreport_2017.pdf (listing the damage from top five most destructive hurricanes: Harvey, Irma, and
Maria in 2017, Katrina in 2005, and Sandy in 2012).
2
Id.
3
See Matthew Cappuci & Jason Samenow, U.S. saw second-most billion-dollar weather
disasters
on
record
in
2021,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
10,
2022)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2022/01/10/billion-dollar-disasters-2021/; NASA, 2021
Tied for 6th Warmest Year in Continued Trend (Jan. 13, 2022) https://www.nasa.gov/pressrelease/2021-tied-for-6th-warmest-year-in-continued-trend-nasa-analysis-shows; NOAA, It’s
official: July was Earth’s hottest month on record (Aug. 13, 2021) https://www.noaa.gov/news/itsofficial-july-2021-was-earths-hottest-month-on-record.
4
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE
PHYSICAL
SCIENCE
BASIS
SUMMARY
FOR
POLICYMAKERS
5
(2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf (“Each of the
last four decades has been successively warmer than any decade that preceded it since 1850.”). And
there is evidence that climate change is causing and exacerbating disasters. See id. at 8 (2021)
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf (stating
that “[e]vidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts,
and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has strengthened since
the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)”).
5
See What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-andresilience/the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean
(defining adaptation as “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual
or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts”).
6
See Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change While Planning for
Disaster, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2203, 2210 (2011) (identifying public benefits as part of adaptation
strategies). Environmental law scholars have debated the meaning and merits of adaptation and
mitigation, including whether adaptation undermines mitigation efforts. However, recent work has
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levels of government to meet people’s basic needs in the wake of these disasters is
immense. More disaster survivors registered for government assistance in 2017
than in the previous 10 years combined.7 At the end of the 2019 fiscal year,
Congress considered the largest annual appropriation for disaster relief for the third
year in a row.8
Fortunately, societies already have social protection systems in place to help
them meet this threat. More than a century ago, national governments began
building welfare states—legal systems designed to better protect people against
various risks of modern life, including unemployment, old age, and industrial
accidents. Over the last hundred years, these welfare states have grown and
persisted despite dramatic changes wrought by deindustrialization and
globalization.9 To be sure, welfare states vary significantly across nations, driven
in part by differences in political coalitions, social movements, and economic
activity.10 But at a certain level of generality, they collectively represent a core
function of government today.11
But as welfare states enter a second century, are they ready for the climate
crisis? As the environmental changes already underway become even more
pronounced, welfare states will face more frequent demands for programs and
services. The climate crisis will challenge the ability of public institutions to feed,
house, and care for those displaced and deprived of necessities. In a sense, climate
change and its attendant environmental catastrophes represent a new risk—or at
least, a newly potent risk—of modern life.
And is the United States, the wealthiest nation on the planet, ready for this
unprecedented challenge? This Article posits that the American welfare state’s
distinctive characteristics—including its reliance on state-administered and
sometimes state-financed services and the resulting racial hierarchy—make it
particularly ill-suited to meet the climate crisis. Indeed, recent events show the
suggested that the climate crisis will necessarily demand both. See, e.g., Katherine Trisolini, Holistic
Climate Change Governance: Towards Mitigation and Adaptation Synthesis, 85 COLO. L. REV. 615
(2014); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles
for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9 (2010).
7
FEMA, 2017 HURRICANE SEASON FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT (July 12, 2018),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_hurricane-season-after-actionreport_2017.pdf.
8
CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE DISASTER RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES, 17–18, figs.1 & 2
(Nov. 13, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45484.pdf; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., FY2019
DISASTER
SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS:
OVERVIEW
(July
30,
2019),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190730_R45844_bf64286a1a01398031c3eb548d3f32476
e2bea80.pdf (documenting increases in federal disaster appropriations over the last several years).
9
See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
10
See id.
11
See, e.g., David Garland, The Welfare State: A Fundamental Dimension of Modern
Government, 55 EUR. J. SOCIO. 327, 356 (2014) (arguing that “the welfare state is not a policy option
that we are free to adopt or reject at will” but rather “a fundamental dimension of modern society,
absolutely integral to the economic functioning and social health of industrialized capitalist
societies”).
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ways in which the U.S. struggles to provide basic assistance to people after climatefueled disasters. In 2017, both California and Texas struggled to immediately
implement disaster food assistance, closing eligibility in some counties before
opening it in others.12 And often federal, state, and local government cannot rely on
public infrastructure, like schools or parks, to deliver benefits in-person. In Oregon,
the air quality at schools was so toxic that that state needed a federal waiver to
deliver sealed meals to children at their homes.13 After Hurricane Irma, 50,000
Floridians lined up at a park in Miami on a single day for food assistance.14 At
another food site in Florida, so many people in line collapsed from heat exhaustion
that police had to shut it down.15
By requiring that people apply for assistance in person, federal and state law
discriminate against those who cannot stand in line for hours, like senior citizens,
children, and people with disabilities—not to mention the people who care for
them. That’s why New Yorkers with disabilities sued their city and state
governments under the Americans with Disabilities Act.16 Yet, FEMA maintains
that it cannot be sued under the Administrative Procedure Act for any discretionary
benefit it provides Americans after a disaster.17 Courts routinely accept the federal
agency’s defense.18 Even if FEMA could be sued, people would find it difficult to
secure adequate representation. While federal law permits disaster legal services,
those services are provided exclusively through volunteers from the ABA’s Young
Lawyers Division.19 And states routinely refuse to permit out-of-state lawyers to
provide representation to disaster survivors.20
Meanwhile, Congress fails to reliably appropriate disaster relief. Following the
horrific 2017 disasters across the country, Congress dithered in enacting additional
appropriations.21 In the end, Iowa waited two months, California waited a few
more, Florida waited nearly eight, and Puerto Rico waited over a year before
Congress finally passed the disaster relief bill.22 This kind of governmental failure
in the face of country-wide devastation is a grim vision of American governance in
the coming decades. Unless we retrofit federal and state law now, more and more
Americans who survive wildfires and hurricanes will go without food, shelter, and
medical care.
With that sense of urgency, this Article makes three contributions. To begin,
the Article analyzes how federal, state, and local government currently administer
public benefits following climate-fueled disasters. Legal scholars who focus on
12

See infra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
15
See id.
16
See infra notes 220–222 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 226–228 and accompanying text.
18
See id.
19
See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 168–172 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 194–206 and accompanying text.
22
See id.
13
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poverty and inequality have paid insufficient attention to how public benefits
programs drive disaster responses.23 The Article also draws lawmaking lessons
from recent examples, including but not limited to the fires in California and the
storms in Florida, New York, Puerto Rico, and Texas. The Article attends to the
litigation, legislation, and regulation that followed. The Article explores how these
government efforts are shaped by and could further exacerbate the tiers of social
citizenship that define the modern welfare state, including the exclusion of
indigenous and territorial Americans.
Second, the Article incorporates lessons from the strengths and weaknesses of
the American safety net’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It lays out how
Congress and state governments used existing welfare programs and created new
ones in their responses to the pandemic. Specifically, the Article shows how
Congress relied on and augmented longstanding programs like Medicaid, SNAP
(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), and unemployment insurance (UI)
to help Americans make ends meet during a national emergency. The COVID-19
pandemic, while deadly and destabilizing in ways few could imagine, provoked our
national government into providing unprecedented financial assistance in the first
year of the pandemic. Marrying an analysis of the pandemic response with lessons
learned from recent climate-fueled disasters points the way forward for further
statutory fixes. The pandemic response illustrates how Congress and state
governments possess significant power to ameliorate suffering and hardship.
Third, the Article concludes with recommendations on how to restructure
public benefit programs to meet this daunting, planetary phenomenon. Here’s a
preview of the climate adaptation agenda for welfare programs laid out in detail
below. First, poor people’s access to these programs should not depend on the
vagaries of politics on Capitol Hill or in the state houses. Instead, policymakers
should decide ex ante who should receive what benefits before a climate-fueled
disaster strikes. Second, these programs should be accessible to all people in need,
not just people who can stand in line for eight hours. Third, these benefits should
not evaporate at a state’s borders, but travel with the people in need. This Article
identifies how federal and state law should change along these lines of reliability,
accessibility, and portability. In doing so, the Article presses the claim that a system
of cooperative federalism cannot rise to the challenge of the climate crisis.
This Article confines its analysis to the means-tested programs that dominate
the discourse of the American welfare state.24 These programs also reach the most
23

The notable exception is MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER
RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013). Dauber’s book charts how
disaster relief helped create the New Deal welfare state, but its account is necessarily confined to
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
24
Means-tested programs refers to those public benefits in which eligibility is based primarily
on need, in contrast to Social Security Old-Age Insurance and Medicare, access to which turns
primarily on past contributions. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL MANDATORY SPENDING
FOR MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS (June 2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/55347MeansTested.pdf (defining means-tested programs as those that “provide cash payments or other
forms of assistance to people with relatively low income or few assets”).
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people. Following the changes in traditional cash assistance the 1996 welfare
reform legislation, the last twenty-five years have seen significant increases in
expenditures in the major means-tested public benefits.25 For different reasons, the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),26 Medicaid,27 SNAP,28 and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI)29 have grown steadily. While not for lack of trying, the
Trump Administration and the 115th Congress were unable to make any longlasting cuts, via legislation or regulation, to any of these programs.30 This Article
also discusses other programs whose funding and reach have deteriorated over time,
such as UI, as well as programs administered by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).31
25

IFE FLOYD ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TANF POLICIES REFLECT RACIST
LEGACY OF CASH ASSISTANCE (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-incomesupport/tanf-policies-reflect-racist-legacy-of-cash-assistance.
26
See Monica Prasad, American Exceptionalism and the Welfare State: The Revisionist
Literature, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 187, 201 (2016) (summarizing the scholarship on the EITC as
demonstrating “how the American welfare state has been surprisingly resilient in the era of
neoliberalism”).
27
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 627 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting in
part) (“Expansion has been characteristic of the Medicaid program.”).
28
See David Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285–86 (2004) (detailing how
“anti-hunger advocates” responded to the demands of welfare reform in the 1990s and managed to
“save[] what in many respects is the best-designed means-tested program in the United States”).
29
See Robert A. Moffitt, The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System, 52
DEMOGRAPHY 729, 730 (2015) (arguing that U.S. social welfare spending grew from 1970 to 2006
with relatively more support for people with disabilities.)
30
See Soc. Sec. Admin., Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability
Reviews: Withdrawal, 86 Fed. Reg. 40,387 (July 28, 2021) (withdrawing proposed change to
additional reviews of SSI recipients); CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(EITC): A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Jan. 12, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44825.pdf
(discussing limited changes to EITC); Andrew Hammond, Litigating Welfare Rights, 115 NW. U.
L. REV. 362, 401–26 (2020) (analyzing the failed efforts to cut SNAP and Medicaid between 2017
and 2020).
31
These programmatic confines have shaped past work. See Andrew Hammond, Territorial
Exceptionalism and the American Welfare State, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2021) (analyzing the
ways in which Americans in the five territories are left out of the typical arrangements for Medicaid,
SNAP, and SSI); Hammond, Litigating Welfare Rights, supra note 30 (discussing legal implications
of the federalism structure of Medicaid and SNAP); Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare
Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 501 (2018) (detailing how federal and state law
excludes many immigrants and their families from Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI); Andrew Hammond,
Ariel Jurow Kleiman & Gabriel Scheffler, How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape
the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 154 (2020). To sweep in more programs,
such as the National Flood Insurance Program, would overwhelm the Article. Others will bring their
insights to bear on the challenges of thinking through how to adapt other legal regimes and
institutions, including ones that bear directly on the well-being of poor people, in the face of a
rapidly warming planet. For instance, the National Flood Insurance Program subsidizes construction
in flood-prone areas. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The National Flood Insurance Program at Fifty:
How the Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine Skews Federal Flood Policy, 31 GEO. ENV’T L. REV.
285 (2019). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development sells foreclosed properties
in those areas. See Huo Jingnan et al., The Federal Government Sells Flood-Prone Homes To Often
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The animating idea for this Article can be summed up in four statements. First,
public benefits in the United States are an integral part of how federal, state,
territorial, tribal, and local governments respond to extreme weather events.
Second, climate-fueled disasters have and will become more frequent and more
devastating. Third, as a result, the peculiarities and pathologies of the American
welfare state, including its attendant racial hierarchy, will undermine our
government’s ability to respond to the ravages of the climate crisis. Fourth, there
are statutory and regulatory changes that would make public benefits more reliable,
accessible, and portable.
Accordingly, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates American antipoverty programs in the climate crisis. Part II explains how the federal, state, and
local governments use welfare programs to respond to extreme weather events. To
do so, the Article dives into the thicket of federal statutes, regulations, and subregulatory guidance that govern these programs. Part III then details the weaknesses
in the status quo, paying particular attention to the role of Congress as well as to
the last decade of recovery efforts. That Part concludes with a survey of the recent
legislative and regulatory response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the hope that it
provides lessons for the climate crisis. Part IV launches an agenda for how
government should adapt U.S. welfare programs for the rapidly changing climate,
identifying possible avenues for federal, state, and local governments.
I. THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE & THE CLIMATE CRISIS
Before we understand how the American welfare state will have to adapt to
meet the climate crisis, we must first understand what the American welfare state
is. This Part provides a brief sketch of the American welfare state’s persistent
pathologies. In a sense, the climate crisis is a new risk of modern life—or at least
one that will become more frequent and more intense. Welfare programs have
always been part of American disaster response—just in ways that escape
traditional narratives of the welfare state.
A. The American Welfare State Today
The United States permits much higher levels of poverty than other wealthy
democracies do. Of the 37 member nations in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States has the highest relative
poverty rate for people of working age and the fifth highest child poverty rate.32
Unsuspecting Buyers, NPR (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/13/1033993846/thefederal-government-sells-flood-prone-homes-to-often-unsuspecting-buyers-npr-. And the U.S.
Department of Agriculture subsidizes farmers in ways that increase the emission of greenhouse
gases like methane. See, e.g., Trevor J. Smith, Corn, Cows, and Climate Change: How Federal
Agricultural Subsidies Enable Factory Farming and Exacerbate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
9 WASH. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 26 (2019).
32
OECD Data: Poverty Rate OECD Data: Poverty Rate, 0-17 year olds, 18–65-year-olds, Ratio,
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Even though the United States has a relatively lower poverty rate among its elderly
population, it still is higher than those of 28 OECD countries.33 Considering these
high levels of poverty amid unprecedented affluence, comparativists often label the
United States as a prototypically residual welfare state.34 These scholars point out
that more so than other wealthy democracies, the United States relies on market
forces, including employment-based schemes of private health care and social
insurance, and only provides minimal government assistance when the private
sector and family resources fail.35 In that sense, the United States appears to have a
weaker welfare state. In another, the American welfare state is not always less
generous than those of other nations. It’s just different. A closer look at the
American welfare state suggests that characterizing the U.S. as a residual welfare
state risks obscuring some of its key features.36
First, this revisionist line of research shows how anti-government politics and
concealed mechanisms of delivery obscure the character and reach of American
social welfare policy—relying as it does on tax-subsidized, employer-provided
benefits.37 Yet, in terms of expenditures, net social spending in the United States as
a percentage of GDP outstrips that of Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.38 By tying social provision to employment, though, the U.S. has ensured
that its social spending is less progressive as a result. The American welfare state,
while larger than previously thought, is comparatively less generous for those who
are too young or too sick to work, not to mention those who care for them.
Second, the United States channels assistance to poor people in exceptional
ways. The federal government relies heavily on its tax system to distribute transfers
not just to upper- and middle-class professionals, but to poor people, especially
through the EITC and the CTC.39 Moreover, the United States runs SNAP, one of
2019 or latest available, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm. (last accessed July 21,
2021).
33
OECD Data: Poverty Rate, 66-year-olds and above, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/povertyrate.htm (last accessed July 21, 2021).
34
See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990); see
also Wil Arts & John Gelissen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A state-of-the-art
Report, J. EURO. SOC. POL’Y 137 (2002) (updating Esping-Andersen’s study).
35
See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, POLITICS AGAINST MARKETS: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
ROAD TO POWER 233 (1985).
36
See Prasad, supra note 26, at 201.
37
See SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE (2011); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE
SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES (2000); see also Jacob S. Hacker, America’s Welfare Parastate, PERSP. ON POLITICS 777,
777 (2016) (describing how this work by emphasizing “what government actually does”
demonstrates “a system of social provision that is much bigger, messier, less equalizing, and less
reflective of the preferences of the political left than prior scholarship indicated”).
38
See Hacker, America’s Welfare Parastate, supra note 37 at 778 (“Let that sink in: A larger
share of the American economy is spent on social benefits than the comparable share of the Swedish
economy.”).
39
See, Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Impoverishment by Taxation, 170 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022); Susannah Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791 (2014); Sara Sternberg
Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study on Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal
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its largest anti-poverty programs, through the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Third, aside from the EITC, CTC, and SNAP, programs for low-income
households exhibit significant variation across the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, the five territories, and tribes. Federal law provides flexibility to states
in structuring and administering public benefits. Some states use that flexibility to
get closer to universal health insurance.40 Others have repurposed federal funds
intended for one program or population for another.41 Consequently, there are states
like Massachusetts where only one in 33 residents lack health insurance, and then
there are states like Texas where one in five go without.42 Thirty states, D.C., and
Puerto Rico have their own EITCs for low-income residents,43 and California is
moving incrementally to a state-funded guaranteed income.44 Therefore, in many
respects, the United States does not have one welfare state; it has more than 50.
Still, that variation has a ceiling. No state in the U.S. has a safety net for poor
people that approaches Canada or the U.K.’s, let alone one of the Nordic countries.
Every state save Vermont must balance their budgets, and countercyclical programs
and balanced budget requirements do not mix.45 Precisely when a state faces
plummeting revenue, it experiences a surge in need. Therefore, it is unlikely that
any state in the union could create a social democratic infrastructure without
significant and sustained federal investment. Moreover, the cooperative federalism
built into these programs permits the exclusion of various groups—immigrants,
tribal members, and territorial Americans—from basic assistance. For decades and
to this day, Americans in the South and predominantly rural states, childless adults,
immigrant Americans, Americans in the territories, and indigenous Americans
experience a markedly different level of social protection.

for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013).
40
See Pakinam Amer, How Massachusetts became a national leader on health care — and how
it
can
lead
again,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Jan.
28,
2020),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/28/opinion/how-massachusetts-became-national-leaderhealthcare-how-it-can-lead-again (describing the state’s efforts, including before the Affordable
Care Act, to cover all residents).
41
See generally DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY (2016) (offering case studies of
states using funding for foster care, Medicaid, and child support for other purposes).
42
KATHERINE KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, U.S. CENSUS BUR. HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2019, TBL. A-3, (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-271.html.
43
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT OVERVIEW, TBL.2 (July 9, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/earned-income-tax-credits-for-workingfamilies.aspx.
44
Adam Beam, California approves 1st state-funded guaranteed income plan, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(July
15,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/government-and-politics-california4fea151e0425f8188337e44a02ab8177.
45
See David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2554, 2605–14
(2005) (describing how traditional theories of federalism “routinely fail to appreciate the gravity of
the constraints in states’ fiscal constitutions” and then detailing those constraints).
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B. American Poverty and the Climate Crisis
Poor people live in parts of the United States that are susceptible to climatefueled disasters. A disproportionate number of poor Americans live only slightly
above sea level.46 Poorer rural areas from the South to the West are particularly
exposed to wildfires.47 While wealthy people also live in areas that are vulnerable
to these catastrophes, poor people have fewer resources to modify and retrofit their
homes and communities to withstand climate change, as well as fewer resources to
relocate temporarily or permanently.48 Poor people will lack the funds to
sufficiently cool their homes in extreme heat, move out of floodplains, and evacuate
in time before storms. Furthermore, poor people are more likely to rely on public
infrastructure like working roads to live and earn a living.49 Moreover, climate
change will impoverish more Americans—destroying livelihoods, wiping out
assets, and creating massive surges in need. In a study of disasters in the U.S. from
1920 to 2010, county-level poverty rates increased as people who could afford to
leave the area did.50 These interlocking relationships between poverty and the
geography of climate change are even more pronounced globally.51
The elderly are especially vulnerable to climate change because many of them
have exacerbating health conditions. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
identifies three main aspects of climate change that affect the elderly in particular:
46

See Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond Environmentalism Part I: Intersectional
Threats and the Case for Collective Action, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 20 (2016) (identifying the
“disproportionate number of economically disadvantaged people living only slightly above current
sea levels” as “one of the biggest” reasons the poor will bear the brunt of climate change).
47
See Dale Kasler & Phillip Reese, “The weakest link”: Why your house may burn while your
neighbor’s survives the next wildfire, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 11, 2019); Cassandra Johnson
Gaither et al., Wildland Fire Risk and Social Vulnerability in the Southeastern United States, 13
FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 24 (2011); Kathy Lynn & Wendy Gerlitz, Mapping the Relationship
Between Wildfire and Poverty, USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-41 (2006),
https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p041/rmrs_p041_401_415.pdf
(measuring
community
capacity in the context of wildfires).
48
Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond Environmentalism Part I: Intersectional Threats
and the Case for Collective Action, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 20 (citing Hurricane Katrina as an
example).
49
Joey Marshall et al., Working from Home During the Pandemic: Those Who Switched to
Telework Have Higher Income, Education and Better Health, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 31,
2021),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/working-from-home-during-thepandemic.html (finding that in households with annual incomes of $200,000 or more, 73.1%
switched to telework compared to 12.7% of households earning under $25,000).
50
Leah Platt Boustan et al., The Effect of Natural Disasters on Economic Activity in US
Counties: A Century of Data (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23410, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23410/w23410.pdf.
51
See Stephane Hallegatte et al., Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on
Poverty, WORLD BANK (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
ROADMAP FORWARD 1 (2014) (concluding that climate change will “intensify the challenges of
global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict,” and cause “food and water shortages, pandemic
disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across
the globe”).
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extreme heat, extreme weather events, and poor air quality.52 Extreme heat and
higher temperatures can increase the risk of illness or death in older adults,
particularly those with congestive heart failure, diabetes, and other conditions that
increase heat sensitivity.53 Heat waves tend to “have the most severe impacts for
the elderly and the very young, who sweat less and have a greater surface area-tobody-mass ratio.”54 Higher temperatures have also been linked to increased
hospitalizations for older people with heart and lung conditions.55 Older adults with
limited incomes who own air conditioning units may not use them during heat
waves due to the high cost to operate them.56
The elderly are also more likely to suffer storm- and flood-related fatalities.
More than half of deaths resulting from Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, and
the 2018 Camp Fire in California were over age 65.57 If an event requires
evacuation, some of the most vulnerable people are older people with disabilities,
with chronic medical conditions, or living in nursing homes or assisted-living
facilities.58 Furthermore, climate-fueled disasters can make it more difficult to
transport patients with their necessary medication, medical records, and
equipment.59 They can also cause power outages that knock out medical equipment
and elevators, leaving some people without treatment or the ability to evacuate.60
As the climate crisis contributes to worsening air quality, the number of older
adults in the ER will increase.61 Poor air quality worsens respiratory conditions
common in older adults such as asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder
(COPD). Air pollution can also increase the risk of heart attack in older adults,
especially those who are diabetic or obese.62
Children will also be particularly vulnerable in this new climate reality. The
American Academy of Pediatrics identifies various climate-related threats to
children: the physical and psychological effects of extreme weather events, heat
stress, decreased air quality, and food insecurity.63 Additionally, the report states
that the social foundations of children’s mental and physical health are threatened
by the effects of climate change, including community and global instability, mass

52

EPA Climate Change and the Health of Older Adults, (May 2016),
https://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/EPA%20Factsheets/older-adults-health-climate-change.pdf.
53
Id.
54
Sheridan Bartlett, The Implications of Climate Change for Children in Lower-Income
Countries, 18 CHILD., YOUTH & ENV’T 71, 73 (2008).
55
Climate Change and the Health of Older Adults, supra note 52.
56
Id.
57
Id.; see also Maria La Ganga et al., Many victims of California’s worst wildfire were elderly
and died in or near their homes, new data show, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018).
58
Climate Change and the Health of Older Adults, supra note 52.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Samantha Ahdoot, Global Climate Change and Children’s Health, 138 PEDIATRICS 1, 1
(2015).
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migrations, and increased conflict.64 Unchecked climate change threatens the safety
and well-being of children by way of its effects on families, schools,
neighborhoods, and communities, including the long-term ramifications of school
closures.65
Children are also uniquely at risk from climate-induced disasters, such as
wildfires, hurricanes, and floods.66 Such events “cause irrevocable harm to children
through devastation of their homes, schools, and neighborhoods,” which, in turn,
impair their physiological, cognitive, and social development.67 According to the
World Health Organization, children under five bear 88% of the burden of disease
attributable to climate change.68 Children are also “more likely than adults to perish
during disasters,”69 more likely to succumb to malnutrition, injuries, or disease in
the aftermath, less likely to receive healthcare and other aid, and more likely to be
subjected to exploitation or abuse.70
As a result, the climate crisis will create significant demands on government to
respond to surges in need among poor people as well as the elderly, people with
disabilities, and children. The next Part explores how federal law currently
structures the government response.
II. WELFARE PROGRAMS & DISASTERS: THE STATUS QUO
With some important exceptions, the federal government finances but does not
administer assistance to poor Americans.71 States, territories, and tribes do. In some
cases, states also contribute to the financing of these national programs. This
underlying federalism of American social provision has profound implications.
States and local government vary widely in their administration of public benefits.72
Meanwhile, the federal financing of these programs has incentivized many states
to expand access, and the federal government has leveraged that fiscal federalism

64

Id.; see also Francesco Agostinelli & Matthias Doepke & Giuseppe Sorrenti & Fabrizio
Zilibotti, When the Great Equalizer Shuts Down: Schools, Peers, and Parents in Pandemic Times,
206 J. OF PUB. ECONS. 104574(2022) (concluding that children living in the poorest 20% of U.S.
neighborhoods will experience the most negative and long-lasting effects of school closures).
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., Kari Nadeau et al., The impact of prescribed fire versus wildfire on the immune and
cardiovascular systems of children, 10 ALLERGY 1989 (2019); David Mills et al., Projecting agestratified risk of exposure to inland flooding and wildfire smoke in the United States under two
climate scenarios, 126 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 47077-1 (2018).
67
Samantha Ahdoot, supra note 63, at 1.
68
Ying Zhang et al., Climate Change and Disability-Adjusted Life Years, 70 J. ENV’T HEALTH
32, 33 (2007).
69
U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND CHILDREN (2007).
70
Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond Environmentalism Part I: Intersectional Threats
and the Case for Collective Action, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2016).
71
The I.R.S. administers the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 26 U.S.C. § 32, and the Social
Security Administration administers Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. § 1381.
72
See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
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in recent years to improve access.73 And federal law permits legal aid lawyers to
sue state and local governments when they violate these program requirements.74
Many public benefit programs in the United States have some disaster response
component that offers state and local governments additional flexibility and funds.
However, this dimension of welfare assistance only comes into play after the
President has issued a disaster declaration for an impacted area. What follows is
first a brief sketch of the procedure for those declarations and then an analysis of
the statutes, regulations, and subregulatory guidance that structures how the federal,
state, and local governments can use public benefit programs in response to a
disaster.
A. Activating Federal Disaster Welfare Programs
The Stafford Act structures the roles federal, state, and local governments play
in disaster relief.75 In order to trigger the response and recovery provisions of the
Stafford Act as well as the attendant federal welfare programs, the President must
declare that a “major disaster” or “emergency” exists.76 The major disaster
declaration is more relevant for our purposes because it is not subject to any funding
cap and makes impacted areas eligible for a greater array of assistance.77 As a result,
its procedure is more complicated.
A major disaster declaration turns on the President’s determination that state
and local efforts cannot adequately respond to the event.78 First, a request must be
made by the governor of the affected state or the equivalent chief executive of a
federally recognized tribe, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), or the
District of Columbia.79 The executive of the state, tribe, or territory sends the
73

See Hammond, Litigating Welfare Rights, supra note 30, at 382–87.
See id. at 387–90.
75
It is also the main substantive statute for FEMA. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
76
See 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1)–(2).
77
42 U.S.C. § 5193(b); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS FOR
COVID-19 FAQ 1, n.2 (2020) (“Compared to emergency declarations, major disaster declarations
authorize a wider range of federal assistance.”). While the President can declare an “emergency”
under the Stafford Act in the manner outlined above, he can also do so sua sponte if he determines
that primary responsibility rests with the federal government based on the Constitution or other
federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b); 44 C.F.R. § 206.35.
78
42 U.S.C. § 5170; 44 C.F.R. § 206.36 (laying out procedure for major disaster declarations).
79
42 U.S.C. § 5122(4)–(5), (12); see Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 219,
113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (amending Section 401 of the Stafford Act to allow federally recognized
Indian tribal governments to pursue a declaration directly from the President); FEMA, TRIBAL
DECLARATIONS PILOT GUIDANCE (2017), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/tribaldeclaration-pilot-guidance.pdf. President Biden recently did so for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
following Tropical Storm Henri. See White House Briefing Room, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Approves the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Emergency Declaration (Aug. 22, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/22/president-joseph-r74
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request to the relevant Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regional
Administrator who, in turn, undertakes an evaluation of the need for federal action,
called a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA). The Regional Administrator then
submits those findings to the Secretary of Homeland Security who shares them with
the President.80
Once the President declares a major disaster, the President directs federal
agencies to support state and local efforts in whatever ways authorized by federal
law.81 The federal government can offer a range of assistance depending on the
types requested by the state, tribal, or territorial leader and the needs FEMA
identified in the initial PDA or subsequent PDA.82 The assistance the federal
government can offer to state, territorial, tribal, and local government is grouped
into three types, one of which—individual assistance—is the focus of the next
Section.83
B. Welfare Programs as Disaster Assistance
Following the disaster declaration, federal agencies can offer state and local
government a range of public benefits for people in need. The rest of this Part
analyzes disaster food assistance, unemployment assistance, other income
assistance, housing assistance, medical assistance, and legal services, in turn.
1. Disaster Food Assistance
The United States is unique among wealthy democracies in the role that food
assistance plays in its welfare state. In a given month, the SNAP program serves
over 40 million Americans. SNAP benefits cost nearly 80 billion dollars each
year.84 Federal law allows states to deliver emergency food assistance to SNAP
households in the wake of disasters. Households may seek replacement benefits
for food purchased with SNAP benefits that was “destroyed in a household
misfortune.”85 However, this individualized process is inefficient following a major
biden-jr-approves-the-mashpee-wampanoag-tribe-emergency-declaration/.
80
Following the declaration, state and tribal authorities can request additional designations and
cost-sharing adjustments and FEMA can make an independent recommendation of the same. 44
C.F.R. § 206.40(c)–(d); 44 C.F.R. § 206.47(b).
81
42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(2).
82
Exec. Order No. 12,673, Delegation of Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Functions
(March 23, 1989) (delegating several functions in Stafford Act to FEMA).
83
See CONG. RES. SERV., A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEMA’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Mar.
8, 2021) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11529; FEMA, HAZARD MITIGATION
ASSISTANCE GRANTS (updated Nov. 1, 2021) https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/.
84
See FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., SNAP DATA TABLES: LATEST AVAILABLE MONTH – JUNE 2021
STATE LEVEL PARTICIPATION AND BENEFITS, https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutritionassistance-program-snap (last accessed Sept. 22, 2021); FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., PROGRAM
INFORMATION REPORT tbl.2, (Sept. 2020), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/datafiles/Keydata-September-2020.pdf.
85
7 C.F.R. § 274.6. The benefit can equal up to the value of the maximum monthly allotment
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disaster. That is why some states have obtained waivers from the Food & Nutrition
Service (FNS) to automatically replace benefits for all SNAP recipients in areas
impacted by a disaster.86 For instance, after Hurricane Harvey, FNS approved a
request by Texas to automatically replace two months of SNAP benefits to
households in the 32 declared counties.87 Furthermore, some SNAP recipients may
need additional assistance, not just because they lost food in the disaster, but
because they lost income as a result of losing their job or facing disaster-related
expenses. For those recipients, they may receive a supplemental benefit in addition
to the replacement benefits.88
In addition to replacement and supplemental SNAP benefits, the federal
government pays for, and states administer, a separate emergency food assistance
program: the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP).89 DSNAP is intended to provide food assistance to households who have suffered food
loss or damage as a result of a disaster and who are not currently receiving SNAP.90
However, to create the temporary program, D-SNAP requires federal and state
coordination.91 After the President has issued a major disaster declaration for
individual assistance under the Stafford Act, as discussed above, a state must first
request permission from the relevant federal agency to operate D-SNAP.92 Once
granted permission, states can begin accepting D-SNAP applications during a
specified period, typically seven days.93
for the household. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(h)(3)(A); 7 C.F.R. § 274.6(a)(3)(iii); see, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF
SOC. SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ALL COUNTY LETTER NO. 21-15 (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://cdss.ca.gov/Portals/9/Additional-Resources/Letters-and-Notices/ACLs/2021/21-15.pdf;
LSNC GUIDE TO CALFRESH BENEFITS, LEGAL SERVS. OF N. CAL., http://calfresh.guide/gettingfood-assistance-after-a-disaster-or-household-misfortune (last accessed Dec. 4, 2021) (explaining
that state agencies can “replace the actual value of food destroyed in a disaster such as a fire for
flood” for a person already receiving SNAP).
86
See, e.g., FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., NORTH CAROLINA DISASTER NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
(Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.fns.usda.gov/disaster/north-carolina-disaster-nutrition-assistance.
87
See, e.g., FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., TEXAS DISASTER NUTRITION ASSISTANCE (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/disaster/texas-disaster-nutrition-assistance.
88
FL. BAR FOUND., FLORIDA DISASTER ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR LEGAL SERVICES
ADVOCATES
(2014
ed.),
https://thefloridabarfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Disaster070214Manual.pdf. SNAP households can also receive expedited
food assistance. 7 CFR § 273.2(a)(2).
89
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DISASTER SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM (D-SNAP), (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.disasterassistance.gov/get-assistance/forms-ofassistance/5769#:~:text=The%20Disaster%20Supplemental%20Nutrition%20Assistance,SNAP%
20in%20a%20disaster%20area.
90
7 U.S.C. § 2014(h); 7 C.F.R. § 280.
91
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., DISASTER SNAP GUIDANCE 1 (July 2014) https://njcdd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/d-snap_handbook.pdf (explaining that “the State has the primary role for
planning, requesting, and operating a D-SNAP”).
92
Exec. Order No. 11,795, Delegating Disaster Relief Functions Pursuant to the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 25, 939 (July 11, 1974); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FNS’ ROLE IN
DISASTER RESPONSE (Jul 29, 2021), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2019/05/10/fns-roledisaster-response (explaining agency’s responsibilities).
93
DISASTER SNAP GUIDANCE, supra note 91, at 9 (detailing the application period).
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D-SNAP has relaxed eligibility criteria compared to SNAP. A recipient simply
must reside in the disaster area, purchase or plan to purchase food during the benefit
period, experience an adverse effect due to the disaster, and meet a fairly generous
income limit.94 While the federal government recommends residency and income
information be verified where possible and that household composition and food
loss be verified if questionable, only the identity of the applicant must be verified.95
Those who apply and qualify for D-SNAP receive a single monthly benefit, which
equals the maximum monthly allotment for a household provided under SNAP.96
Currently, that is $535 for a household of three in the continental United States with
higher benefit amounts for households in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.97 As with SNAP, the federal government pays for 100% of these
benefits and half of the administrative costs.98
As a result of these relaxed eligibility standards and the federal funding formula,
D-SNAP is an integral part of disaster recovery. As mentioned above, the 2017
hurricane season was one of the most active seasons on record. Three Category 4
storms (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) made landfall in less than a month. In the wake
of those disasters, over three million households in Texas, Florida, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands received food assistance through D-SNAP, expedited SNAP, and
replacement benefits.99 And while D-SNAP recipients typically receive one month
of benefits, the federal government has recently approved longer benefit periods,
including following the 2017 storms.100
D-SNAP, like many welfare programs in the U.S., excludes many Americans
who live in territories or are members of tribes. Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have benefited from D-SNAP because the Food and Nutrition Act treats them the
same as states for the purposes of SNAP.101 Yet, American Samoa, Puerto Rico,
and CNMI do not have access to SNAP and therefore do not have access to D-

94

See id. at 12–13.
See id. at 17.
96
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DISASTER SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (DSNAP) FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2022 INCOME ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS, https://fnsprod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/media/file/FY2022-DSNAP-IncomeEligibilityStandardsreviewed.pdf (effective October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022).
97
Compare id. tbl.1 with tbls. 2–4.
98
7 U.S.C. § 2025; see FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF STATE VARIATION
IN
SNAP ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FINAL REPORT
(June
2019)
https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/media/file/SNAP-State-Variation-Admin-CostsFullReport.pdf.
99
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV. DISASTER RESPONSE SUMMARY: FY 2017,
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/FNS-Disaster-Response-SummaryFY17.pdf.
100
Compare DISASTER SNAP GUIDANCE, supra note 91, at 1 (stating that “D-SNAP provides
one month of benefits to eligible disaster survivors”) with, e.g., TEXAS HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
TEXAS WORKS BULLETIN 17-13 (Sept. 26, 2017) (stating that “Hurricane Harvey D-SNAP
households will receive two full-months of D-SNAP allotments”).
101
7 U.S.C. § 2012(r).
95
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SNAP.102 As we will see in Part III, the federal exclusion of Puerto Rico
exacerbated the island’s challenges after Hurricane Maria. Similarly, D-SNAP has
inconsistent and limited reach among federally recognized tribes. Some tribes
choose to participate in the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations
(FDPIR) instead of SNAP, but a household’s post-disaster participation in FDPIR
disqualifies them from receiving D-SNAP.103
Furthermore, D-SNAP can only function if the ways in which most Americans
purchase food are available. Like SNAP, D-SNAP relies on typical channels of
food distribution. Federal law therefore allows federal and state agencies to channel
other types of food assistance to people following disasters, which especially
complement SNAP and D-SNAP when grocery stores cannot stay open. Following
a major disaster declaration, states can get permission from FNS to release
commodity foods from federal programs and send them to congregate feeding sites
or directly to households.104 The federal agency will then replace the commodity
foods after the disaster.105 After Hurricane Katrina, congregate feeding sites
operated for over two months in this fashion. Ten months after the storm, some
households continued to receive food directly from the government.106
Federal law also allows states to waive requirements to child nutrition and
school meals programs to feed more people.107 After Sandy, New York was allowed
to provide free meals to displaced families in New York City, regardless of
income.108 After Harvey, the federal government permitted impacted schools to
recalculate the number of students who qualify for free and reduced meals at
school.109 After the wildfires in 2017, the federal government allowed Oregon to
use its Summer Food Service Program to send children home with meals. Oregon
sought this waiver because some of the schools where the children would eat were
under air quality alerts issued by the National Weather Service.110 And while the
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
has no statutory disaster provision, it has been used in the past to accommodate
disaster conditions with ready-to-feed infant formula and other food items that do
102

Hammond, Territorial Exceptionalism, supra note 31, at 1671.
DISASTER SNAP GUIDANCE, supra note 91, at 12.
104
FOOD RSCH. & ACTION CTR., THE FRAC ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO THE DISASTER
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (D-SNAP) 7 (2018), https://frac.org/wpcontent/uploads/d-snap-advocates-guide-1.pdf [hereinafter “ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO D-SNAP”].
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., LETTER TO REGIONAL AND STATE DIRECTORS RE: DISASTER
RESPONSE, GUIDANCE, FNS-GD-2014-0042, (May 9, 2014), https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/disasterresponse.
108
USDA Will Fund Free Meals for NYC Schools Post-Sandy, PATCH (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://patch.com/new-york/windsorterrace/usda-will-fund-free-meals-for-nyc-schools-post-sandy934dc124.
109
ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO D-SNAP, supra note 104, at 8.
110
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., USDA PROVIDES OREGON CHILDREN IMPACTED BY WILDFIRES
MORE
FLEXIBLE
ACCESS
TO
MEALS
SERVICE
(Sept.
7,
2017),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pressrelease/2017/010517.
103
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not require refrigeration.111
Thus, there are significant opportunities for increased federal food assistance,
provided states and other local governments apply. However, many of these
practices are governed only by agency guidance. USDA promulgated a final
version of its proposed rule for Disaster SNAP in 2016.112 The Trump
Administration withdrew the proposed rule along with others, purportedly to reduce
regulatory backlog.113 Part IV returns to how the federal government could create
a more streamlined and equitable structure for disaster food assistance through
regulation. That Part will also explore what states can do, in the absence of national
lawmaking, to prepare for the next climate-induced catastrophe.
2. Disaster Unemployment Assistance
In the U.S., unemployment insurance (UI) has a racialized past and present.
Members of Congress crafted the Social Security Act of 1935 to exclude domestic
and agricultural workers from UI—sectors of the labor force that disproportionately
employed women, Black people, and immigrants.114 Today, the federal government
has not updated UI to address the realities of work. In many states, UI excludes
people who are working gig jobs, looking for part-time work, and those who leave
their jobs to care for an ill family member.115 These exclusions disproportionately
impact women, Black people, Latinos, and immigrants.116
Unlike SNAP, though, the federal government does not cover the cost of
unemployment benefits. Rather, the federal government contributes to funding the
administration of each state’s UI program, but the states finance most of the
programs’ benefits. States also administer the program subject to only a few federal
requirements. While employers and employees contribute to these state systems via
payroll taxes, states repeatedly underfund their UI programs.117 In most states,
unemployed workers can receive up to 26 weeks of benefits at a rate of about half
of their previous wages or a maximum benefit amount, whichever is higher. In
111

ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO D-SNAP, supra note 104, at 10–12.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Disaster Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (D-SNAP), 81 Fed. Reg. 28,738 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.
272, 274, 280).
113
84 Fed. Reg. 47,443 (Sept. 10, 2019) (withdrawing Emergency Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance for Victims of Disasters Procedures).
114
See CYBELLE FOX, THREE WORLDS OF RELIEF: RACE IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO THE NEW DEAL 250–89 (2012) (discussing these
features of the Social Security Act).
115
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
CHARTBOOK, , https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/Chartbook (updated Jan. 12, 2022); Brian
Galle, How to Save Unemployment Insurance, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009, 1049–53 (2018).
116
JOSH BIVENS ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., REFORMING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (June
2021), https://files.epi.org/uploads/Reforming-Unemployment-Insurance.pdf.
117
See TATIANA FOLLETT & ZACH HERMAN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE FUNDING OVERVIEW (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/new-ui-page.aspx.
112
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February 2020, the average weekly benefits were about $387 nationwide and
ranged from $215 in Mississippi to $550 in Massachusetts.118 As we will see in Part
III, Congress passed significant legislation to shore up these state UI programs in
the face of the pandemic.119
The Stafford Act authorizes the federal government to let states set up Disaster
Unemployment Assistance (DUA).120 However, unlike UI, which is largely funded
by the states, DUA is financed through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which
Congress funds with annual appropriations that carry over year to year.121 Just as
D-SNAP mirrors SNAP’s structure, DUA uses a similar administrative apparatus
to typical, non-emergency unemployment insurance.122 The U.S. Department of
Labor oversees the program, but state agencies implement it.123 Individuals receive
DUA for the weeks of unemployment during the Disaster Assistance Period (DAP).
Like the benefit period of D-SNAP, the DAP begins immediately after the major
disaster began. However, unlike D-SNAP, which typically lasts only a month, DUA
can continue for up to 26 weeks after that date. Congress has extended DUA past
the 26-week limit three times: after the September 11th terrorist attacks, after
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and after Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017.124 In the
most recent extension, Congress added an additional 26 weeks (up to 52 weeks
total) for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands
as a direct result of Hurricanes Irma and Maria.125 Unlike D-SNAP, though, the
benefit levels of DUA are not uniform across the country. Rather, the benefit levels
equal the prevailing weekly benefit amounts of each state’s UI program and cannot
exceed them.126 While minimum weekly benefits cannot drop below half of the
average benefit amount in the relevant state, DUA perpetuates significant variation
in benefit levels across states and the territories.127
118
See Till von Wachter, Unemployment Insurance Reform, 686 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 121 (2019).
119
See infra Part III.C.1.
120
See 42 U.S.C. § 5177(a).
121
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DISASTER RELIEF FUND: FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION (Feb. 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Federal%20Emergency%20Management%20
Agency.pdf.
122
See 20 C.F.R. § 625.15.
123
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 625.1–30 (laying out structure and procedure of DUA).
124
See Act of Mar. 25, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-154, 116 Stat. 80 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 5177) (extending DUA from 26 to 39 weeks for major disaster areas in New York and
Virginia); Katrina Emergency Assistance Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-176, 120 Stat. 191 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C § 5177) (same, but for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita); FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186 (extending DUA retroactively
for an additional 26 weeks for unemployed persons in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands); see
also CONG. RSCH. SERV., DISASTER UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (DUA) 4 (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22022.pdf (describing the legislation).
125
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186.
126
20 C.F.R. § 625.6(a). Federal regulations establish a different benefit formula for territories.
See 20 C.F.R. § 625.6(c)–(d).
127
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
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Like D-SNAP, DUA is available to those who are ineligible for regular state
unemployment insurance. However, here, the distributive consequences are
flipped. Whereas D-SNAP is potentially regressive because it does not reach people
already poor enough to receive SNAP, DUA’s structure is potentially progressive.
That’s because to qualify for DUA, a person must have lost their job or be unable
to access their job as a result of a major disaster and that person must be ineligible
for regular UI. Because UI is less likely to cover part-time workers, including those
in the gig economy and those who are unemployed because they need to care for a
family member, states have an opportunity with DUA to compensate for UI’s
patchy coverage.
3. Other Income Assistance
In addition to DUA and D-SNAP, other public benefits provide income
assistance to people recovering from disasters. Like DUA and unlike SNAP, these
other income assistance programs do not restrict how recipients can use this
assistance. Federal law permits expedited or advanced payments to individuals who
receive Social Security Old Age Insurance, SSDI, and SSI, but recipients need to
request these expedited payments.128 Moreover, in the past, Congress has
occasionally allowed eligible taxpayers to elect to use their prior year’s filing to
calculate their current year’s EITC following a major disaster.129
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) has played a rather minor
role in providing cash assistance after disasters. As part of the 1996 welfare reform
legislation, Congress established a TANF contingency fund for states to deliver
additional assistance in times of increased need, but as the GAO has explained, it
“has not proven to be an inviting option to states in need for several reasons.”130
PROGRAM LETTER NO. 26-20: MINIMUM DISASTER UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (DUA) WEEKLY
BENEFIT AMOUNT (June 25, 2020), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.cfm?DOCN=7999;
see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
(updated Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/unemployment-insurance
(detailing that “before the start of the COVID-19 recession in February 2020, average weekly
benefits were about $387 nationwide but ranged from a low of $215 in Mississippi to $550 in
Massachusetts, and were only $161 in Puerto Rico”).
128
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.520 (describing “emergency advance payments” for SSI); SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., RS 0281.010, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS): IMMEDIATE PAYMENT
(IP) CRITERIA AND PROCESS (2012), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0302801010 (same
for OASDI and SSDI); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-252T, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF 20 (Feb. 2007) (charting the “dramatic increase” in immediate
payments in 2005 compared to 2004).
129
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 406, 119 Stat. 2016,
2028; Heartland Disaster Tax Relief of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 701, 122 Stat. 3765, 3912;
Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-63, § 504, 131
Stat. 1168, 1183; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., TAX POLICY AND DISASTER RECOVERY, CRS R45864
(Feb. 11, 2020) (discussing these statutory changes).
130
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-252T, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA
DISASTER RELIEF 18 (Feb. 2007); see also Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92
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Congress passed legislation to create a separate TANF emergency fund for states
impacted by Katrina, but there, too, few people received assistance through that
program.131 There is limited evidence that TANF plays an important role in disaster
relief.132
FEMA itself administers some income assistance programs. Chief among them
is the Individual and Household Program (IHP).133 IHP is intended for anyone
“who, as a direct result of a major disaster, [has] necessary expenses and serious
needs in cases in which the individuals and households are unable to meet such
expenses or needs through other means.”134 IHP is limited to 18 months following
the date of the major disaster declaration.135 The benefit amounts are set by statute
at $25,000, with FEMA adjusting the statutory cap each year based on the
Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index.136 Right now, the IHP cap stands at
$36,000.137 There are two categories of assistance through IHP: Housing Assistance
and Other Needs Assistance (ONA). The federal government shoulders the entire
cost of the former and 75% of the latter.138 ONA can cover various expenses like
loss of personal property, covering funeral costs, childcare, and other costs.139
However, amounts of ONA assistance for each category are set beforehand by
FEMA and the relevant state, territorial, or tribal government.140 Housing
assistance, the other category of FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program, is
WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1751–52 (2017) (discussing TANF’s post-Katrina record).
131
TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-68, 119 Stat. 2003.
132
See HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF, supra note 134, at 18–21; PUBLIC
WELFARE LAW, supra note 23 at 844-45 (comparing TANF post-Katrina unfavorably to D-SNAP).
133
42 U.S.C. § 5174; 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(a); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEMA INDIVIDUAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW 4 (Dec. 5, 2019) (describing IHP as “the primary way
FEMA assists disaster survivors”); Jordan Ballard et al., Natural Disasters, Access to Justice, and
Legal Services, 17 CUNY L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (asserting that IHP is “the most significant source of
benefits for individuals following a natural disaster”).
134
42 U.S.C. § 5174(a).
135
FEMA, FP 104-009-03, INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE (IAPPG)
47, n.50 (2021).
136
42 U.S.C. § 5174(h) (capping IHP assistance at $25,000 to be adjusted annually by FEMA
according to the Labor Department’s CPI); 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(b) (same). Congress required that
FEMA establish more objective criteria for evaluating the need for assistance and clarify eligibility
requirements. See Disaster Relief Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (2013); 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.48(b).
137
Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households Program,
85 Fed. Reg. 69,340 (Nov. 2, 2020).
138
42 U.S.C. § 5174(g)(1)–(2); 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(i)(1)–(2).
139
See IAPPG, supra note 135, at 48, fig. 4; FEMA, FACT SHEET: CRITICAL NEEDS ASSISTANCE
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/critical-needs-assistance. ONA also includes
Critical Needs Assistance, which are limited, one-time $500 payments for immediate needs such as
food, water, first aid, medications, and personal hygiene items. FEMA, ONA ADMINISTRATIVE
OPTION SELECT FORM, O.M.B. CONTROL NO. 1660-0061 (expires Dec. 31, 2021),
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_individuals-households_ONAadministrative-option_Form_010-0-11.pdf.
140
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEMA INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW (Dec.
5, 2019).
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taken up next.
4. Disaster Housing Assistance
Both FEMA and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) administer programs that help people with the costs of housing, including
affording temporary housing if their homes cannot be occupied after the disaster,
repairing their homes damaged by the storm, making mortgage and rental
payments, and securing new mortgages.141 FEMA’s housing assistance through
IHP, like ONA discussed above, is paid directly to eligible recipients and can cover
various expenses. IHP’s Financial Housing Assistance can include funds for home
repairs or replacement as well as reimbursement for short-term lodging or rental
housing when a recipient was displaced from their home.142 In addition, FEMA
provides direct housing assistance for those survivors who otherwise lack access to
housing in the impacted area.143 For instance, FEMA provides transportable
temporary housing units (TTHUs), like RVs or mobile homes.144 FEMA purchases
and then leases these TTHUs to eligible applicants for a limited period of time.145
Along with FEMA’s housing assistance, HUD provides disaster mortgage and
rehabilitation assistance through its Federal Housing Administration (FHA).146
Following a major disaster declaration, FHA activates a mortgagee letter—referred
to as a Section 203(h) letter—that makes it easier for disaster survivors to get
mortgages to buy or rebuild their homes.147 To secure a Section 203(h) letter, an
individual must own and occupy a single-family home that was damaged or
destroyed in a presidentially declared disaster. FHA also offers rehabilitation
mortgage insurance—referred to as a Section 203(k) letter—that helps impacted
households secure a mortgage that includes the cost of rehabilitation, finance the
rehabilitation of their existing home, and afford smaller repairs.148 To secure a
Section 203(k) letter, an individual must be able to make monthly mortgage
payments and be rehabilitating a home that’s at least a year old.149 Taken together,
these FEMA and HUD programs attempt to assist individuals whose homes have
been damaged as a result of a disaster.

141

Id. at 5-7.
See IAPPG, supra note 135, at 49–51.
143
Id. at 51.
144
Id. at 50.
145
See id.
146
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV, HUD DISASTER RESOURCES (Sept. 3, 2021),
http://hud.gov/info/disasterresources.
147
12 U.S.C. § 1709(h); 24 C.F.R. § 203.1.
148
12 U.S.C. § 1709(k)(4); 24 C.F.R. § 203.50.
149
See HUD, 203(h) Mortgage Insurance for Disaster Victims and 203(k) Rehabilitation
Mortgage Insurance: General Program Requirements, https://www.disasterassistance.gov/getassistance/forms-of-assistance/4703.
142
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5. Disaster Medical Assistance
Medicaid pays for health care for low-income Americans, which the federal
and state governments jointly fund, but states administer.150 Federal law requires
that states cover certain populations and certain services through Medicaid,151 but
states can also cover additional groups of people and provide additional services to
all groups with a federal financial match.152 The federal government must provide
states with matching funds, which vary in proportion to state wealth, referred to as
the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).153 Importantly, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) can provide states with some
increased flexibility and support for their Medicaid program following a disaster
even in the absence of a major disaster declaration, provided the Secretary has
declared a public health emergency.154 However, state flexibility is maximized
when both the Secretary and the President declare an emergency or disaster.
Following either a public health emergency declaration or a major disaster
declaration, states may temporarily revise eligibility, enrollment, and benefits for
Medicaid through state plan amendments, which have minimal procedural hurdles
compared to waivers.155 A state can relax its income eligibility requirements for
certain populations,156 delay the verification process of renewals for people in
affected areas,157 and temporarily suspend co-payments and other costs to
recipients.158 For example, Puerto Rico’s Medicaid plan typically only provides
150

42 U.S.C. § 1396-1.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
152
Id. § 1396a; see also MACPAC, FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATE OPTIONS: BENEFITS
(March 2017), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Federal-Requirements-andState-Options-Benefits.pdf (enumerating state options to cover additional groups or provide
additional services).
153
42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) passim.
154
See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 247d).
155
See CMS: MEDICAID & CHIP COVERAGE LEARNING COLLAB., INVENTORY OF MEDICAID
AND CHIP FLEXIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES IN THE EVENT OF A DISASTER (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/downloads/mac-learning-collaboratives/medicaidchip-inventory.pdf; see also MACPAC, ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID’S ROLE IN DISASTERS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH
EMERGENCIES,
(March
2018),
https://www.macpac.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Medicaid%E2%80%99s-Role-in-Disasters-and-Public-HealthEmergencies.pdf (discussing state options). Last year, CMS created a Medicaid State Plan
Amendment template in response to all the state requests during the COVID-19 pandemic. CMS,
SECTION 7 – GENERAL PROVISIONS, 7.4. MEDICAID DISASTER RELIEF FOR THE COVID-19
NATIONAL EMERGENCY, https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/downloads/medicaiddisaster-relief-spa-template.docx (last accessed Sept. 18, 2021).
156
42 C.F.R. § 435.218.
157
42 C.F.R. § 435.211 (Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 457.342 (CHIP); see, e.g, CMS, Louisiana
1902(e)(14) request (Aug. 22, 2016); CMS, California Wildfires Approval Letter (Jan. 30, 2018).
158
42 C.F.R. § 447.55(b)(4) (Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 457.515 (CHIP); see also CMS, Letter to
Michigan Medical Services Administration re: Section 1115 Demonstration (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/CMS_Approval_-_Flint_Waiver_3-316_516241_7.pdf; CMS, Letter to Texas State Medicaid/CHIP Director (Aug. 31, 2017),
151
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coverage for emergency services off-island, but the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) allowed the territory to permit recipients to receive offisland non-emergency coverage after Hurricane Maria.159 Federal law also requires
that states facilitate easier Medicaid enrollment following a disaster. For instance,
federal regulations require that states accept self-attestation when an applicant’s
documentation is unavailable due to a disaster.160 Federal law also prohibits states
from denying or terminating Medicaid to residents who have had to evacuate
temporarily to another state.161 These flexibilities help to ensure that medical care
can continue during a disaster.
6. Disaster Legal Services
Considering the intricacies of these different programs run by different
agencies, individuals will need assistance navigating the various eligibility
requirements. Fortunately, the Stafford Act includes legal services among its
individual assistance categories.162 Federal regulations stipulate that these legal
services are intended to help low-income individuals,163 but only to secure benefits
or make claims arising out of a major disaster.164 Lawyers can help with insurance
claims and home repair contracts, draw up legal documents (such as wills) lost in
the disaster, and file appeals of FEMA decisions.165 Unfortunately, the legal
services contemplated by the Stafford Act are done exclusively by volunteers. The
ABA’s Young Lawyers Division provides these services pro bono pursuant to an
agreement with FEMA, and these volunteer lawyers refer fee-generating cases to
local lawyers.166
What’s more, state bars, by definition, restrict out-of-state lawyers from
https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/CHIP/Downloads/TX/TX-17-0043.pdf.
159
CMS, Puerto Rico 1115 Demonstration Approval Letter (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/pr/pr-disaster-relief-ca.pdf.
160
42 C.F.R. § 435.952(c)(3).
161
42 C.F.R. § 435.403(j)(3) (Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 457.320(e) (CHIP); 42 C.F.R. § 431.52
(authorizing payments to out-of-state providers for Medicaid services); see also CMS, Dear State
Medicaid Directors Letter re: National Demonstration following Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 6, 2005),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/SHO-05-001.pdf; KAISER FAM.
FOUND., A COMPARISON OF THE SEVENTEEN APPROVED KATRINA WAIVERS, (Jan. 2006),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7420.pdf.
162
42 U.S.C. § 5182.
163
44 C.F.R. § 206.164(a) (defining “low-income individuals” as “those disaster victims who
have insufficient resources to secure adequate legal services, whether the insufficiency existed prior
to or results from the major disaster”).
164
44 C.F.R. § 206.164(e).
165
42 U.S.C. § 5182; 44 C.F.R. § 206.164; see also FEMA, DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES FACT
SHEET (Apr. 2019) (discussing limitations on legal practice).
166
44 C.F.R. § 206.164(b) (mandating that these legal services “shall be provided free,” but that
“fee-generating cases shall not be accepted by lawyers operating under these regulations”);
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REGARDING DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES (May 2012).
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representing individuals in disaster-related matters. Following Katrina, the
Louisiana bar adopted a temporary rule that allowed lawyers not admitted to that
state’s bar to provide pro bono services to people affected by Katrina so long as
they worked through a non-profit legal aid organization. Since then, roughly 20
states and territories have adopted some version of this major disaster rule, often
referred to as a “Katrina Rule,” and the ABA has endorsed a model rule.167 For
instance, after Sandy, New York adopted the ABA Model Rule.168 However, some
states and territories have declined to do so. The Florida Bar Association proposed
a major disaster rule in 2012, but the Florida Supreme Court rejected it.169
California also declined to adopt a rule following the 2017 wildfires, relying instead
on attorneys admitted to California and trained by a state initiative to respond to
disasters.170 Puerto Rico also declined to adopt a Katrina Rule following Hurricane
Maria.171 The Texas bar has not adopted a major disaster rule, but the Texas
Supreme Court did promulgate temporary orders to allow out-of-state lawyers to
practice temporarily following Hurricane Harvey in 2017 and the winter storms in
2021.172
***
This overview of federal law shows that the United States maintains various
types of assistance to individuals after disasters. A few patterns emerge. Some
programs, like D-SNAP and DUA, are extensions or expansions of existing
programs. Others are disaster-specific, like FEMA’s housing assistance. And some
are simply temporary allowances or waivers, like Medicaid’s relaxed application
procedures. Notably, the first two types of programs offer additional resources,
whereas the third is simply making existing resources more accessible. These
167
Am. Bar Ass’n, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates amending Comment [14] to
Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Feb. 12, 2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/as/hundredf
our.pdf;
MODEL
RULES
OF
PRO.
CONDUCT
R.
5.5
cmt.
14,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pro
fessional_conduct/rule_5_5_unauthorized_practice_of_law_multijurisdictional_practice_of_law/.
168
RULES OF THE CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF N.Y. § 520.11(d) (laying out procedure
for “Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster”); see also STATE OF
N.Y.
CT.
OF
APP.,
NOTICE
TO
THE
BAR
(Nov.
14,
2012),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/nottobar/NottoBar111412.pdf (implementing rule after
Sandy).
169
In re: Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (Biennial Report), 101 So. 3d
807, 808 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
170
See
Disaster
Legal
Assistance
Collaborative,
About
Us,
https://disasterlegalservicesca.org/about-the-team/ (accessed June 23, 2021).
171
Carolina Bolado & Natalie Rodriguez, ‘Now Is The Real Crisis’: Puerto Ricans Struggle
For Disaster Aid, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2019) (describing concerns among Puerto Rican lawyers that
the civil law provenance of that territory’s law would be particularly challenging for other lawyers).
172
See, e.g., SUPREME CT. OF TEXAS, MISC. DKT. NO. 21-9027, EMERG. ORD. (March 5, 2021),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1451832/219027.pdf; SUPREME CT. OF TEXAS, MISC. DKT. NO. 179101, EMERG. ORD. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1438820/179101.pdf.
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patterns will resurface in the rest of the Article. For now, it is important to
remember that all of these programs require federal, state, and local coordination.
As the next Part demonstrates, the ways in which these programs reach people on
the ground are flawed and must be strengthened if the government is to
meaningfully adapt public benefits for the climate crisis.
III. WELFARE’S WEAKNESSES IN THE CLIMATE CRISIS
As Part II shows, in the wake of a climate-fueled disaster, the United States
relies on state and local governments to request and administer basic services. But
just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, the American welfare state is
only as responsive as its least responsive state. Furthermore, this default of
cooperative federalism, by definition, excludes millions of Americans, including
tribal members, residents of the territories, and immigrants. As a result, the federal
government consistently struggles to deliver a forceful, coordinated response to
poverty and inequality because it relies on states to implement and sometimes fund
that response. As this Part will explain, these federalism arrangements make the
American welfare state particularly vulnerable to the persistent and intensifying
shocks of the climate crisis. Fortunately, though, the government’s reliance on
public benefits to combat the COVID-19 pandemic points to possible paths forward
to strengthen those programs for the climate crisis.
A. Congress in Extremis
Before we see the weaknesses in relying on states and FEMA as first responders
to these extreme weather events, we should consider how Congress has acted as the
backstop for funding basic assistance to Americans in distress. As with other
inquiries into the role of Congress, this Section explores whether Congress can still
enact legislation and appropriate funds in a responsive and equitable manner during
the climate crisis.
1. Diminished Congressional Capacity
Political scientists have shown how, over the last twenty-five years, Congress
has become increasingly dysfunctional as the inputs of a two-party electoral system
fueled by partisan polarization fail to create a workable legislative.173 Now that no
Democratic member’s voting record overlaps with any Republican counterpart in
their respective chamber, Congress cannot routinely reach the compromises
necessary to act as a national legislature system.174
173
See THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED (2012); Sarah A. Binder, Legislating in Polarized
Times, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (LAWRENCE C. DODD & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER EDS., 11th ed.
2016).
174
Compare Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL.
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In addition to the incompatibility of polarized electoral politics and
supermajoritarian bicameralism, Congress has less lawmaking capacity.175
Members of Congress spend fewer days in session than they used to.176 When they
are on Capitol Hill, they spend more and more time fundraising.177 Members of
Congress routinely skip committee meetings,178 and our Congressional
representatives have fewer people working for them than they did fifty years ago.179
Moreover, Congress lacks resources in comparison to the companies who lobby
it. Corporations now spend more money lobbying Congress than taxpayers spend
to fund the People’s Branch.180 Congress also loses its expertise to K Street. Hill
staff routinely leave for more lucrative jobs in the lobbying industry,181 and more
than half of the members of Congress who left office after 2010 now lobby
Congress.182
As Congress’s capacity to function has waned, it has had to rely more on
lobbyists and agencies to write legislation and expect agencies to fill in the gaps
SCI. 261 (2015) with GREGORY KOGER & MATTHEW J. LEBO, STRATEGIC PARTY GOVERNMENT:
WHY WINNING TRUMPS IDEOLOGY (2017).
175
See generally Timothy M. Lapira et al., Overwhelmed: An Introduction to Congress’s
Capacity Problem, in CONGRESS OVERWHELMED: THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM (TIMOTHY M. LAPIRA ET AL. EDS. 2020) (collecting research that suggested
Congress lacks the “organizational resources, knowledge, expertise, time, space, and
technology…to perform its constitutional role”).
176
See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., HOW CONGRESS GOVERNED IN A POLARIZED ERA: 2007-2018
(Mar. 2019) (detailing how “in recent years, Congress has kept a suboptimal work schedule in
Washington, which provided less time for legislating, reviewing federal programs, and fulfilling its
most basic duty: funding the government.”)
177
See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., GOVERNING IN A POLARIZED AMERICA 53 (2014),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-CPRReport.pdf#page=54 (“From a practical standpoint, by traveling home every weekend and
fundraising during most free moments while in session in Washington, members are insulated from
personal contacts with those of the other party.”); Lee Drutman, Yet Another Retiring Member of
Congress Complains About the Misery of Fundraising, VOX (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/1/8/10736402/congress-fundraising-miserable;
Planet
Money, Welcome To Congress. Now Start Calling Strangers To Ask For Money, NPR (Jan. 9, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/01/09/168958774/welcome-to-congress-now-startcalling-strangers-to-ask-for-money (reporting on a PowerPoint slide used by the DCCC to incoming
freshman urging them to spend 4 hours on “call time” every day they are in Washington).
178
Luke Rosiak, Many House members miss more than two-thirds of their committee meetings,
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/many-house-membersmiss-more-than-two-thirds-of-their-committee-meetings.
179
Molly E. Reynolds How Congress Fell Behind the Executive Branch, in CONGRESS
OVERWHELMED 36 (TIMOTHY M. LAPIRA ET AL. EDS. 2020).
180
See Ezra Klein, Corporations Now Spend More Lobbying Congress than Taxpayers Spend
Funding Congress, VOX (July 15, 2015.
181
Joshua McCrain, Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff
Connections, 80 J. POL. 1369 (Oct. 2018).
182
See OPENSECRETS & REMAPPING DEBATE, REVOLVING DOOR: FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
111TH CONGRESS, http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/departing.php?cong=111; Jeffrey Lazarus
et al., Who Walks through the Revolving Door? Examining the Lobbying Activity of Former
Members of Congress, 5 INT. GRPS. & ADVOC. 82 (2016).
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with regulations.183 And what happens when Congress cannot delegate its
authority? At best, Congress relies on unorthodox lawmaking.184 At worst, the
federal government shuts down.185 There were four government shutdowns in the
1980s, but none lasted more than a day. The last three—in 2013, December 2018,
and January 2018—combined to last 54 days.186 While the budget and
appropriations process has departed from the regular order as a site of unorthodox
lawmaking for some time, in the words of Gillian Metzger, “the gap between the
ideal and the real has grown much larger of late.”187 While Congress enacted a
budget resolution every year from 1975 to 1998, it has failed to do so seven of the
last ten years.188 These realities of national lawmaking in the United States risk
making Congress increasingly unresponsive precisely when the people it purports
to represent will need immediate and drastic action as the planet becomes more and
more hostile to human life. Already we can see ways in which Congress’s current
state have impeded disaster relief.
2. Congress and Emergency Appropriations
Congress’s dysfunctionality, a product of its partisan polarization and eroded
capacity, can impact the degree to which it is a responsive institution—meaning its
“ability to prioritize and call attention to public problems.”189 This responsiveness
includes its ability to put issues on the agenda and keep others off.190 One type of
Congressional responsiveness is the extent to which our national legislature is able
to appropriate funds for various federal efforts. Looking at recent disaster relief
efforts as a proxy for whether Congress will be capable of adapting welfare
programs, the People’s Branch has a mixed record.
Congress has consistently appropriated emergency funds for disaster relief
183

See Johnathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV.
1931, 1938–46 (2020); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1387–97 (2017).
184
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (5th ed. 2016).
185
See David Gamage & David Scott Louk, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing
Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 220–24 (2015) (discussing the 2013 shutdown).
186
See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE EFFECTS OF THE PARTIAL SHUTDOWN ENDING IN JANUARY
2019 4–6 (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54937.
187
Gillian Metzger, Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2021).
188
Id.
189
Lee Drutman & Timothy M. Lapira, Capacity for What? Legislative Capacity Regimes in
Congress and Possibilities of Reform, in CONGRESS OVERWHELMED: THE DECLINE IN
CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 15 (TIMOTHY M. LAPIRA ET AL. EDS.
2020) (defining responsiveness as “a responsive legislature calls forth and attends to the most
important public problems, prioritizing in a way that reflects the significance and urgency of the
issues at hand”).
190
For the political science literature on democratic responsiveness and agenda setting, see,
e.g., GARY W. COX & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984).
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since the Civil War.191 In the past, Congress made disaster appropriations without
offsetting those funds with budget cuts elsewhere.192 Following the 2010 midterm
elections, Congressional Republicans began insisting on budget offsets for any
disaster relief appropriations.193 This new climate for disaster relief on Capitol Hill
explains in part why, in 2013, following Superstorm Sandy, Congress took so long
to pass an appropriations bill for the affected areas.194 Congress’s response time for
an emergency appropriation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was seven days. For
Hurricane Katrina, Congress took ten days. For Superstorm Sandy, Congress took
91.195 These offsets also help explain the long delay in enacting an emergency
appropriation to address the water crisis in Flint, Michigan. The Senate passed such
an appropriation unanimously in May 2015, but the House stalled for over 18
months.196
Congress’s inability to enact disaster relief in 2018 could prove prophetic. In
early September 2017, Congress made initial disaster appropriations for Florida,
Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands’ recovery efforts following multiple
storms.197 Hurricane Maria then struck Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017. Maria,
the strongest storm to ever hit Puerto Rico, knocked out the entire power grid.
Congress made another appropriation in February 2018 of supplemental funding to
address damage caused by disasters in the previous year.198 The widespread
devastation and humanitarian crisis on the island prompted many members of
Congress to call for supplemental appropriations for Puerto Rico in 2018, but the
legislation went nowhere for months.199
191
See THE SYMPATHETIC STATE, supra note 23, at 25 (describing how Congress passed
“between 1860 and 1930 … more than ninety separate relief measures for various fires, floods,
droughts, and famines”); PATRICK S. ROBERTS, DISASTERS AND THE AMERICAN STATE: HOW
POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE PUBLIC PREPARE FOR THE UNEXPECTED 16–40 (2013)
(discussing origins of federal response to disasters).
192
Carl Hulse, Federal Austerity Changes Disaster Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011).
193
Id.; see also Gregory W. Meeks, A Storm in Congress: How Partisanship Impacts Disaster
Response, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 447, 449–51 (2016) (identifying the new Republican House majority
in the 112th Congress as changing the politics of disaster relief on Capitol Hill). To be sure, as
climate disasters become more common, such relief becomes more regular, making it feel more like
normal budget appropriations rather than one-off major spending.
194
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (Jan. 29, 2013);
see also Danshera Wetherington Cords, An Inflection Point for Disaster Relief: Superstorm Sandy,
35 TOURO L. REV. 926, 946 (arguing that that delay “marked a severe shift in Congressional funding
for disaster relief”).
195
See Cords, supra note 194, at 946; Meeks, supra note 193, at 450.
196
Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, 130 Stat. 1628
(2016). See Susan Milligan, Playing Games with a Disaster, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 30,
2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-30/the-partisan-politics-of-disaster-relief.
197
See Continuing Appropriations Act of 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster
Relief Requirements Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-56, div. B, 131 Stat. 1129, 1137.
198
See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 21101, 132 Stat. 64, 103.
199
See Charley E. Willison, Quantifying Inequities in U.S. Federal Response to Hurricane
Disaster in Texas and Florida Compared with Puerto Rico, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH (2019); BRYNNE
KEITH-JENNINGS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, PUERTO RICO FORCED TO SLASH BASIC
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Meanwhile, the climate-fueled disasters kept on coming. Hurricane Michael,
the first Category 5 hurricane to hit the United States in twenty-five years and the
fourth-strongest hurricane to hit the country ever, struck Florida, causing an
estimated $25.1 billion in damage.200 On the other side of the country, California
endured, according to the state’s forestry agency, the “deadliest and most
destructive wildfire season on record.”201 In 2018, 7,500 fires burned in an area of
over 1.67 million acres in California. Among them, the Camp Fire on November 8,
2018 killed more people than any other in the state’s history.202 Then on December
22, 2018, President Trump and Congress’s disputes led to the federal government
shutdown.203 Lasting 35 days, it was the longest in U.S. history. When the
government reopened, it still took another four months for the 2018 disaster
appropriations to become law. The fight over additional funding for Puerto Rico
ensnared emergency appropriations for California and Florida, not to mention Iowa,
which had endured historic floods.204 In the end, Iowa waited two months,
California waited a few more, Florida waited nearly eight, and Puerto Rico waited
over a year before Congress finally passed the disaster relief bill. 205 As then-Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell put it, “I believe I’m correct that this has taken
longer than after any previous disaster to address the problem.”206
Perhaps this combination of partisan polarization, Congressional inaction, and
a government shutdown stretching for weeks was an aberration. The extreme
weather that created the devastation was not. Congress will be tested more
frequently in the coming years to provide disaster relief in a timely manner to reach
people in need. It seems likely that the saga of disaster relief in 2018 and 2019 is a
harbinger of things to come.

FOOD AID WHILE WAITING FOR WASHINGTON TO ACT (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/puerto-rico-forced-to-slash-basic-food-aid-while-waiting-forwashington-to-act.
200
Assessing the U.S. Climate in 2018, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 6,
2019), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/national-climate-201812.
201
STATE OF CAL., 2018 INCIDENT ARCHIVE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2018/.
202
Id.
203
DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, USDA TO FUND SNAP FOR
FEBRUARY 2019, BUT MILLIONS FACE CUTS IF SHUTDOWN CONTINUES (Jan. 10, 2019).
204
Marianne Levine, Disaster aid stalls in Senate, as Trump revs up attack on Puerto Rico,
POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/02/senate-democrats-disasterrelief-amendment-1249169.
205
Press Release, Off. of Sen. Marco Rubio, After Unnecessary Delay, House Finally Passes
Disaster Bill (June 3, 2019), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/6/afterunnecessary-delay-house-finally-passes-disaster-bill; Li Zhou, Congress finally passes $19 billion
in
disaster
aid,
VOX
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/6/3/18647872/congress-disaster-aid-puerto-rico-donald-trump.
206
Leigh Ann Caldwell & Frank Thorp V, Republicans signal new willingness to pass disaster
aid bill, NBC (May 7, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/republicans-signal-newwillingness-pass-disaster-aid-bill-n1003046.
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B. Delays and Disparities in Distributing Relief
This status quo of disparate disaster welfare programs and Congressional
dysfunction means that FEMA, state agencies, and local governments must wait for
federal funding, but then have a fair amount of flexibility in making these public
benefits available. However, there are weaknesses and drawbacks in the
government response. It is undoubtedly difficult to administer governmental
programs that were not available to residents in an impacted area before a storm
but are suddenly critical to their survival. These surges in need can easily
overwhelm state and local bureaucracies tasked with distributing assistance.207
Nonetheless, this Section documents how disaster welfare assistance is often
delayed and improperly distributed. Moreover, these programs often fail to
accommodate the elderly and people with disabilities, and racial disparities persist
in terms of access and generosity.
1. Delays in Distributing Relief
As discussed above, assistance to individuals following extreme weather events
can sometimes be delayed on Capitol Hill—the 2018 disaster appropriations being
the most recent egregious example. But delays occur at the state level, too. Delays
in disaster food assistance are instructive. For instance, after Hurricane Harvey in
2017, Texas immediately distributed replacement food assistance to more than
700,000 households already receiving SNAP.208 But Texas waited weeks to
implement D-SNAP anywhere in the state.209 When state officials did implement
D-SNAP, they initially excluded the cities of Corpus Christi and Houston because
of the “large volumes of people who would not be able to be efficiently served
through a local [welfare] office.”210 As a result, Texas closed D-SNAP eligibility
in some parts of the state before it had opened D-SNAP eligibility in others.211 New

207

David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1442-44 (2011) (discussing
this phenomenon with Hurricane Katrina).
208
CHARLES SMITH, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. HURRICANE HARVEY RELIEF EFFORTS
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.hhs.texas.gov/file/74331/download?token=hmvorhBt (legislative
presentation to the House Appropriations Committee).
209
Christopher Collins, Still No Deal Between State and Feds on Disaster Food Aid for Harvey
Victims, TEXAS OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.texasobserver.org/still-no-deal-betweenstate-and-feds-on-disaster-food-aid-for-harvey-victims/ (“It’s unknown why Texas hasn’t launched
the emergency program yet.”).
210
OFF. OF THE TEX. GOVERNOR, PRESS RELEASE: TEXAS EXPANDS FOOD BENEFITS FOR
HARVEY VICTIMS (Sept. 11, 2017), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/texas-expands-food-benefitsfor-harvey-victims.
211
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REBUILD TEXAS, EYE OF THE STORM 74 (Nov. 2018),
https://www.rebuildtexas.today/wp-content/uploads/sites/52/2018/12/12-11-18-EYE-OF-THESTORM-digital.pdf; Disaster Food Benefits: Key Points, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/services/financial/d-snap-key-points.pdf
(listing dates available by county).
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Jersey did not launch its D-SNAP program until nearly three weeks after Sandy.212
Even though New York implemented D-SNAP quicker than New Jersey did, some
of New York City’s offices remained closed because of storm damage and were
thus unable to distribute the benefits.213 Following the fires that struck California
that same fall, the state reported that D-SNAP assistance only became available
after many of the state’s disaster centers were beginning to close.214
This challenge of finding physical infrastructure to distribute assistance raises
other challenges for state and local government. After Harvey and Irma, Florida
and Texas experienced significant difficulties as individuals tried to apply for DSNAP in person.215 In Texas, people reportedly waited in line for seven or eight
hours to apply for benefits.216 Meanwhile, 50,000 people lined up at a park in Miami
on a single day to receive emergency food assistance.217 At another D-SNAP site
in Florida, so many people in line collapsed from heat exhaustion that police had to
shut down the site.218 These failures are emblematic of a federal regulatory regime
that insists on state and local institutions to construct a benefit access system
essentially overnight and precisely when those institutions have experienced
widespread destruction.
2. Disparities in Distributing Relief
These cooperative federalism arrangements also create disparities when state
and local agencies distribute assistance. Considering federal law requires that
individuals apply for D-SNAP assistance in person, it necessarily excludes those
people with limited mobility. As a result, senior citizens and people with disabilities
routinely miss out on emergency assistance. Unsurprisingly, there has been a spate
of lawsuits against federal and state agencies for administering these post-disaster
public benefits in ways that discriminate against and fail to accommodate people

212

Christopher Collins, Still No Deal Between State and Feds on Disaster Food Aid for Harvey
Victims, TEXAS OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.texasobserver.org/still-no-deal-betweenstate-and-feds-on-disaster-food-aid-for-harvey-victims/.
213
Alice Hines, After Sandy, NYC Food Stamp Centers Crowded With Hungry Families,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sandy-food-stamp-centersnyc_n_2078862.
214
FOOD RSCH. & ACTION CTR., CALFRESH FIGHTS HUNGER IN THE FACE OF CALIFORNIA
WILDFIRES (Dec. 2017), https://frac.org/blog/calfresh-fights-hunger-face-california-wildfires.
215
Christopher Collins, Still No Deal Between State and Feds on Disaster Food Aid for Harvey
Victims, TEXAS OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.texasobserver.org/still-no-deal-betweenstate-and-feds-on-disaster-food-aid-for-harvey-victims/.
216
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REBUILD TEXAS, supra note 211, at 74.
217
Glenn Garvin, 50,000 Line Up Outside Tropical Park Seeking Post-Hurricane Food
Assistance, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 15, 2017), https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/documentview?p=NewsBank&docref=news/1678ED9441C02690.
218
Monique Madan, Food Assistance Centers Close After People Suffer Heat Exhaustion in
Line, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 14, 2017), https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/documentview?p=NewsBank&docref=news/1678D8E5C3957EE8.
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with disabilities.219
Take for instance two lawsuits involving D-SNAP. Poor New Yorkers with
disabilities alleged that New York State’s and New York City’s agencies violated
federal and state law in administering D-SNAP over a seven-day period following
Sandy.220 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the state and local agencies failed
to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities.221 New
York decided to only allow in-person applications at one full-time site in Brooklyn
and one part-time satellite site on Staten Island.222 Floridians brought a similar
lawsuit following Hurricane Irma in 2017.223 The day after the state was sued,
Florida’s Department of Children and Families asked the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to waive its in-person D-SNAP interview requirement so that elderly
applicants and applicants with disabilities who had pre-registered with the state
agency could apply telephonically.224 The federal government granted that
waiver—the first of its kind—two weeks later.225
While these lawsuits largely involve disaster food assistance, there is a reason
why there are fewer lawsuits involving FEMA. FEMA claims that it cannot be sued
for any violation related to its distribution of benefits under the Stafford Act.226
Section 701(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits judicial review of
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”227 In various lawsuits,
FEMA has argued that its actions are discretionary and therefore the agency is
immune from suit when it distributes benefits after a disaster, and federal courts
routinely accept that defense.228
219

See Disaster Preparedness and Response: The Special Needs of Older Americans:
Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 115th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2017).
220
See Complaint at ¶¶ 1–2, Toney-Dick v. Doar, No. 12-cv-9162 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Food and Nutrition
Act, and state and local law).
221
Id.; see also Rafferty v. Doar, 2013 WL 3328168 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 2013) (class action
complaint).
222
See Complaint at ¶¶ 19, 58, Toney-Dick v. Doar, No. 12-cv-9162 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
223
Miami Workers Ctr. v. Carroll, No. 17-cv-24027 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017).
224
See Letter from Liesta Sykes, Director of Economic Self-Sufficiency, Fla. Dep’t of Children
&
Fams.,
to
Peggy
Fouts,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Agric.
(Nov.
3,
2017),
https://www.myflfamilies.com/newsroom/docs/SupplementalNutritionAssistanceProgram11.03.17.pdf.
225
FLORIDA DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMS, USDA TO ADMINISTER TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS FOR
SPECIAL NEEDS APPLICANTS UNABLE TO PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEW FOR D-SNAP (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.myflfamilies.com/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/20171117DCF,%20USDA%20to%20Administer%20Telephone%20Interviews%20for%20Special%20Need
s%20Applicants%20Unable%20to%20Previously%20Interview%20for%20DSNAP.shtml.
226
See In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir.
2012) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of FTCA claims); see generally John K. Pierre &
Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA’s Failure to Provide Housing for
Victims of Natural Disasters, 68 LA. L. REV. 443, 478–82 (2008) (discussing challenges of suing
FEMA).
227
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
228
See, e.g., Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2008); Santos v. FEMA, 327 F. Supp.
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While HHS and FEMA must comply with federal nondiscrimination statutes,
which include the requirement to ensure access to their programs to persons with
limited English proficiency, federal law prohibits some immigrants from accessing
some of these programs.229 Only U.S. citizens and immigrants with certain legal
statuses, such as Lawful Permanent Residents, can receive assistance through
FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program.230 These restrictions mirror other
prohibitions on serving immigrant families through public benefits.231 As a result,
since many households are mixed-status in the United States in which citizen
children are living with parents who are not “qualified aliens,” those children who
are, in fact, eligible for assistance do not receive it because of their parents’ fear
and distrust of government.232
Moreover, federal and state agencies sometimes distribute disaster aid in
racially disparate ways. Researchers have found evidence of racial disparities in
how FEMA administers IHP benefits.233 Some Texans alleged that FEMA’s high
denial rates of housing repair applications in the Rio Grande Valley reflect longstanding racist practices regarding colonias—communities along the border that
have repeatedly been excluded from infrastructure investment.234 Researchers have
also found that FEMA’s grants in Houston following Hurricane Harvey
disproportionately benefited the wealthy.235
3d 328 (D. Mass. 2018); McWaters v. FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. La. 2006); Ass’n of Cmty.
Org. for Reform Now v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
229
See 42 U.S.C. § 18116; 42 C.F.R. § 92.101.
230
See Citizenship and Immigration Status Requirements for Federal Public Benefits, FEMA
(Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/program/citizenship-immigrationstatus.
231
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
restricted access to Medicaid, SNAP, SSI, and TANF to U.S. citizens and “qualified aliens.”
Subsequent Congresses restored some immigrant eligibility, but millions of immigrants continue to
be excluded from basic assistance. See ELISA MINOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y,
THE LASTING LEGACY OF EXCLUSION (Aug. 2021), https://cssp.org/resource/the-lasting-legacy-ofexclusion/.
232
Abby Goodnough & Margot Sanger-Katz, Medicaid Covers a Million Fewer Children. Baby
Elijah
Was
One
of
Them,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/upshot/medicaid-uninsured-children.html.
233
Simone J. Domingue & Christopher T. Emrich, Social Vulnerability and Procedural Equity:
Exploring the Distribution of Disaster Aid Across Counties in the United States, 49 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 8 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023120905439; Junia Howell
& James R. Elliot, Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of Natural Hazards on Wealth
Inequality in the United States, 66 SOC. PROBS. 448 (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article/66/3/448/5074453?login=true.
234
La Union del Pueblo Entero (LUPE) et al. v FEMA, 141 F. Supp. 3d 681 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
see also Carolina Cuellar, Colonias Bear The Heaviest Burden When Rain Falls In The Rio Grande
Valley, TEX. PUB. RADIO (July 22, 2021), https://www.tpr.org/border-immigration/2021-0722/colonias-bear-the-heaviest-burden-when-rain-falls-in-the-rio-grande-valley (discussing case).
235
Stephen B. Billings et al., Let the Rich Be Flooded: The Distribution of Financial Aid and
Distress after Hurricane Harvey (May 30, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396611 (presenting
evidence that “evidence that disaster assistance programs—both SBA loans and FEMA IHP
grants—are regressive in allocation”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4232439

36

ON FIRES, FLOODS, AND FEDERALISM

[28-Sep-22

Current federal and state processes in using public benefits to respond to
disasters exhibit significant flaws including delayed appropriations, improper
distribution, persistent barriers to access, and racial disparities. Fortunately, some
of these flaws in the status quo can be fixed. Before explaining how to do that, it is
worth reflecting on what lessons the government’s response to the COVID-19
pandemic offers for climate adaptation.
C. Lessons from the COVID-19 Response
The United States has endured some of the worst infection and mortality rates
during the global COVID-19 pandemic,236 and some experts have suggested that a
lack of consistent leadership at both the national and state level exacerbated the
pandemic.237 This Section does not weigh in on that debate. Rather, it focuses on
what the use of public benefits in the pandemic response might mean for future
government responses to the climate crisis.
In some ways, the federal government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
tracked its response to the climate-fueled disasters discussed above. In response to
the pandemic, President Trump granted major disaster declaration requests for all
fifty states, D.C., and the five territories.238 It was the first time the Stafford Act
was used to declare a public health disaster. And just as federal law deploys public
benefits as disaster relief, the federal government similarly relied on these programs
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
How the federal and state governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic
using public benefits deserves (and, in some ways, has already gotten) its own
lengthy analysis.239 However, for the purposes of thinking through how the U.S.
should adapt its welfare programs to meet the climate crisis, this Section elaborates
on three interlocking lessons from the pandemic. First, the federal government will
rely on existing programs to deliver immediate assistance. Second, as a result, the
response will reinforce the racial hierarchy that structures the American welfare
state. Third and finally, lawmakers, and perhaps voters, seem more willing to
consider universal or quasi-universal cash benefits—which, in turn, can, but do not
always, avoid the racialized pitfalls of preexisting programs.240

236

See COVID-19 DASHBOARD BY THE CENTER FOR SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
(CSSE), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2022);
German Lopez, How the US’s Covid-19 death toll compares to that of other wealthy countries, VOX
(Jan. 11, 2021).
237
See, e.g., The U.S. is Missing Key Opportunities to End the COVID-19 Pandemic, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 15, 2021); The Editors, Dying in a Leadership Vacuum, NEW. ENG.
J. MED. (Oct. 7, 2020).
238
FEMA,
COVID-19
DISASTER
DECLARATIONS
(Aug.
20,
2021),
https://www.fema.gov/disasters/coronavirus/disaster-declarations.
239
See, e.g., Hammond, Kleiman, & Scheffler, supra note 31.
240
See Alex Rees-Jones et al., COVID-19 Changed Tastes for Safety-Net Programs (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 27865, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27865.
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1. Reliance on Existing Programs
The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was vast, various, and
arguably inadequate. Yet, despite the wide-ranging set of policies and programs,
the federal government relied heavily on existing programs to deliver assistance to
Americans struggling with illness, unemployment, food and housing insecurity, and
care responsibilities.241 A look at how the federal government relied on existing
food, unemployment, and medical assistance shows the path dependency of the
pandemic response.
a. Food Assistance
Before COVID-19 spread throughout the United States, over 37 million
Americans received SNAP benefits.242 More Americans found it harder to afford
food in light of the health and economic dimensions of COVID-19, including the
widespread closures to limit the virus’s spread. For instance, more Americans used
food pantries and other charitable organizations for food assistance in early 2020
than at any time since at least 2014.243 Even if the federal government had made no
changes to SNAP, use of the program would have surged, as it has in past crises.244
That’s because SNAP is an automatic stabilizer—it covers more people and
provides more assistance during economic downturns, and it contracts as the
economy recovers.245 But Congress accelerated and amplified SNAP’s impact by
allowing states to make “emergency allotments” for SNAP households, thereby
permitting states to give the maximum benefit to more households.246 Congress also
241

See, e.g., Diane Schanzenbach & Abigail Pitts, How Much Has Food Insecurity Risen?
Evidence from the Census Household Pulse Survey, NW. UNIV. INST. FOR POL’Y RSCH. (June 10,
2020), https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/documents/reports/ipr-rapid-research-reports-pulse-hhdata-10-june-2020.pdf; Lauren Bauer, The COVID-19 Crisis Has Already Left Too Many Children
Hungry in America, BROOKINGS INST.: THE HAMILTON PROJ. (May 6, 2020).
242
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., SNAP: FY18 THROUGH FY21 NATIONAL VIEW SUMMARY (Sept. 3,
2021), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/34SNAPmonthly-9.pdf.
243
See Marianne Bitler et al., The Social Safety Net in the Wake of COVID-19, Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 27796 (2020).
244
James P. Ziliak, Why are so many Americans on food stamps? The role of the economy,
policy, and demographics, in SNAP MATTERS: HOW FOOD STAMPS AFFECT HEALTH AND WELL
BEING (Judith Bartfeld et al. eds. 2015) (discussing reasons for SNAP’s ubiquity).
245
Robert A. Moffitt & James P. Ziliak, COVID-19 and the U.S. Safety Net, 41 FISCAL STUD.
515, 544 (2020) (concluding that unlike other U.S. anti-poverty programs, “SNAP has functioned
well overall as an automatic stabilizer”); see also Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Gabriel Scheffler, &
Andrew Hammond, Legislating a More Responsive Safety Net, in COVID-19 AND THE LAW:
DISRUPTION, IMPACT AND LEGACY (I. Glenn Cohen & Abbe R. Gluck eds.) (forthcoming 2022)
(making the case for automatic stabilizers).
246
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 16-127, § 2302(a)(1), 134 Stat. 178,
188 (2020); see also FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., MEMORANDUM FROM JESSICA SHAHIN, SNAP
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR TO SNAP STATE AGENCIES (March 20, 2020), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAP-COVIDEmergencyAllotmentsGuidance.pdf.
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suspended all SNAP work requirements for the duration of the emergency
declaration, provided more funding to states for the administrative costs in light of
the surge in need, and made additional appropriations to other nutrition
programs.247
Congress did create a new food assistance program in response to the pandemic,
but even that new program is old. Congress authorized the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to allow states to create a “Pandemic EBT” program.248 This food
assistance provided families with an amount equal to the school meals missed from
school closures.249 Roughly 30 million children receive free or reduced-price meals
at school.250 Pandemic EBT allowed participating states “to provide approximately
$250 to $450 per child in grocery benefits (depending on the average number of
days schools closed in the state) to make up for the meals missed in the spring of
2020.”251 The states loaded these new benefits onto EBT cards (the same
technology used for SNAP). Initially, all 50 states, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands
participated in Pandemic EBT. Congress extended Pandemic EBT benefits three
times so that assistance could continue through Summer 2021.252
b. Unemployment Assistance
Congress also expanded the amount, duration, and scope of unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits for those who lost work due to the COVID-19 pandemic.253
247

Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 16-127, §§ 1102, 2301(a), 2302(a)(1),
134 Stat. 178, 180, 187–88 (2020); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, §
1101(b), 135 Stat. 4, 15; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 704;
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. § 1013 (2021).
248
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 16-127, § 1101(b)–(i), 134 Stat. 178,
179–80 (2020). By late August 2020, the U.S. Department of Agriculture had approved Pandemic
EBT programs in all fifty states, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PRESS
RELEASE: USDA APPROVES PROGRAM TO FEED KIDS IN IDAHO: PANDEMIC EBT NOW AVAILABLE
IN ALL 50 STATES (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.fns.usda.gov/news-item/usda-032920.
249
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., STATE GUIDANCE ON CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC EBT (P-EBT) (June
2,
2020),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/
SNAP-CN-COVID-PEBTGuidance.pdf (explaining that the “household allotment amount will be
no less than the value of school meals at the free rate over the course of five (5) school days for each
eligible child in the household”); see also Lauren Bauer et al., The Effects of Pandemic EBT on
Measures of Food Hardship, THE HAMILTON PROJ. (July 2020) (analyzing impact). Congress
extended Pandemic EBT with an additional $5 billion appropriation through the end of the
designated public health emergency. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, § 1101(b).
250
See ZOË NEUBERGER ET AL., LESSONS FROM EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PANDEMIC-EBT
OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN ROLLOUT FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2020-2021, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES & FOOD RSCH. & ACTION CTR. (updated Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-8-20fa.pdf [hereinafter LESSONS FROM
EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PANDEMIC-EBT].
251
Id.
252
URBAN INST., STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO THE 2020-21 PANDEMIC EBT PROGRAM (Aug. 31,
2021), https://www.urban.org/state-guide-pandemic-ebt.
253
State governments also implemented their own changes to unemployment benefits. See
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., COVID-19: UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS (July 16, 2020),
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The CARES Act provided a $600 per week UI supplement—called Federal
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation—through July 31, 2020,254 followed by
an additional $300 per week payment for 11 weeks,255 to be paid on top of state
benefits. Congress also extended the duration of benefits, providing additional
weeks of federally funded support for workers who had exhausted all state
benefits.256 Congress then extended these UI benefits twice.257 The stimulus bills
also temporarily expanded UI eligibility. Congress provided federal funding for
states to pay benefits to workers who lost hours (even if they retained their jobs).
Congress also created a new program called Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
(PUA) for non-employee workers otherwise excluded from UI programs.258
c. Medicaid
Congress financed states’ costs of rising Medicaid enrollment, in part, to
prevent states from cutting benefits. In the Families First Act, Congress temporarily
increased the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for state and
territorial Medicaid programs by 6.2% until the end of the public health
emergency.259 States had to meet various conditions to be eligible for the increased
matching funds, including not imposing more restrictive Medicaid eligibility
standards or procedures, increasing premiums, or terminating beneficiaries from
the program involuntarily.260 Every state took the offered FMAP increase.261 In part
because of these policies, recent statistics document that Medicaid enrollment
surged during the pandemic.262
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/covid-19-unemployment-benefits.aspx.
254
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2104, 134 Stat.
281, 318–21 (2020).
255
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182, 1263.
256
Id.
257
The Appropriations Act extension ran through March 14, 2021. Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 201, 134 Stat. 1182, 1396. The American Rescue
Plan extended the UI scheme further through September 6, 2021. American Rescue Plan Act of
2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 2901, 135 Stat. 4, 49.
258
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2102, 2108,
2109, 134 Stat. 281, 313–17, 328–30 (2020).
259
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 16-127, § 6008, 134 Stat. 178, 208–
09 (2020). Congress also provided $178 billion in funding for medical providers. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CARES ACT PROVIDER RELIEF FUND (JAN. 21, 2021).
260
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 16-127, § 6008, 134 Stat. 178, 208–
09 (2020).
261
Nicole Huberfeld & Sidney Watson, Medicaid’s Vital Role in Addressing Health and
Economic
Emergencies,
in
COVID-19
POLICY
PLAYBOOK
(Aug.
2020)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5956e16e6b8f5b8c45f1c216/t/5f445cba4de0e201344f78d3/
1598315706858/Chp13_COVIDPolicyPlaybook-Aug2020.pdf.
262
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DECEMBER 2020 & JANUARY 2021
MEDICAID
AND
CHIP
ENROLLMENT
TRENDS
SNAPSHOT,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/national-medicaid-chip-programinformation/downloads/december-2020-january-2021-medicaid-chip-enrollment-trend-
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2. Newfound Enthusiasm for Cash
In addition to relying on existing programs, Congress showed a newfound
enthusiasm for cash payments. Congress initially directed the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to send “recovery rebate” checks of $1,200 per person and $500 per
child to millions of American households.263 Congress then authorized additional
payments of $600 per person, including children, in late 2020 and $1,400 per person
in early 2021.264
Congress also temporarily modified the structure of the EITC and the Child Tax
Credit (CTC). The EITC provision allowed taxpayers to use their 2019 income,
rather than their 2020 income, to calculate the credit amount for 2020.265 This
change ensured that taxpayers would not receive a smaller credit because they lost
work due to the pandemic.266 In 2021, Congress made the CTC fully refundable
and available to otherwise eligible taxpayers with no earned income. The American
Rescue Plan also temporarily increased the amount of the CTC for low- and middleincome taxpayers to up to $3,600 per child for a child under 6 and up to $3,000 for
children between the ages of 6 and 17.267
To sum up, Congress was willing to spend and spend big. There may be
multiple reasons for this flurry of legislation. There appeared to be an understanding
on Capitol Hill that the federal fiscal response to the Great Recession was
insufficient.268 It was also a presidential election year. The response from
Washington might have been different if the President, the entire House, and a third
of the Senate were not up for reelection. Despite that electoral reality, Congress still
dithered for months after the initial round of stimulus in early 2020, while millions
of Americans got sick or were out of work. Congress passed the first four stimulus
bills in a six-week period between early March and late April 2020, but then did
not pass additional stimulus for eight months (and only then at end of the lameduck session on December 27th). Nonetheless, the level of national action had a
massive and measurable impact: despite the heaviest job losses since the 1930s,
snapshot.pdf.
263
26 U.S.C. § 6428.
264
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 203 134 Stat. 1182, 1263;
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9601, 135 Stat. 4, 138–44. Payments
phased out for income above $75,000 for individuals and $150,000 for married couples.
265
Consolidated Appropriations Act §§ 4946–47; American Rescue Plan Act § 9626.
266
American Rescue Plan Act, § 9621. Congress also temporarily expanded both eligibility for
and the amount of EITC for those without qualifying children by lowering the minimum age and
raising the maximum age. The legislation also temporarily increased the maximum childless EITC
increases from $543 to $1,502 in 2021.
267
American Rescue Plan Act, § 9611. These increases gradually phased out until the credit
amount equaled the previous maximum of $2,000 per child. These thresholds are $75,000 for
individuals and $150,000 for married couples. Id.
268
See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, About That Next Bailout: One Big Lesson from 2009, POLITICO
(Aug. 3, 2020).
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poverty went down in 2020.269 Another insight is that the greater extent to which
climate disaster relief continues to be thought of as a localized or regional problem,
the more likely appropriations will be subject to partisanship. The COVID-19
pandemic, while not hitting the country with equal force at the same time, has been
national and global in scope. That might explain why the federal government was
willing to craft such a forceful fiscal response.
3. Fractures Along State and Racial Lines
Despite the flurry of Congressional activity in response to the pandemic, not all
the federal funds reached people in need. There are three main reasons for this, all
of which reinforce our understanding of how federalism and a racial hierarchy
define American social policy. These insights provide additional lessons for how
to adapt welfare programs in the face of climate change.
a. Uneven State Implementation
First, the federal government’s reliance on existing programs, many of which
rely on state administration, meant that the implementation of pandemic-related
relief across the country would necessarily be quite uneven. Some states are better
than others at implementing federal welfare law. For instance, in several states
including Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, and New York, agencies could not respond
to the volume of applications for unemployment insurance.270 New Jersey asked
applicants to file online before 7 a.m. or after 10 p.m. so as not to overload the
system.271 One may be tempted to explain away this state-level bungling. After all,
more Americans lost their jobs in 2020 than at any time since 1939.272 Perhaps this
was simply an unprecedented demand on state bureaucracies. But states have
routinely ignored and disinvested in their unemployment insurance systems since
269

Ben Casselman & Jeanna Smialek, U.S. Poverty Fell Last Year as Government Aid Made
Up
for
Lost
Jobs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/business/economy/census-income-poverty-healthinsurance.html.
270
Emilee Speck, Florida DEO limits number of people able to access CONNECT
unemployment
site,
CLICKORLANDO
(Apr.
29,
2020),
https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/04/29/florida-deo-limits-number-of-people-ableto-access-connect-unemployment-site/; Karolina Buczek, Kentucky unemployment claims overload
system, but state is working on a fix, LEX 18 WASHINGTON (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.lex18.com/news/coronavirus/kentucky-unemployment-claims-overload-system-butstate-is-working-on-a-fix.
271
Megan Cassella & Katy Murphy, States overwhelmed by previously unimaginable layoff
numbers, POLITICO (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/01/unemployedworkers-benefits-coronavirus-159192.
272
Sarah Chaney Cambon & Danny Douherty, Job Losses in 2020 Were Worst Since 1939,
With Hispanics, Blacks, Teenagers Among Hardest Hit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/job-losses-in-2020-were-worst-since-1939-with-hispanics-blacksteenagers-among-hardest-hit-11610133434.
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the Great Recession.273 As already discussed, there are fiscal reasons why states do
so. States feel little pressure to fund countercyclical programs during boom times,
and due to their budget rules, they are incapable of doing so during downturns.
Similar delays at the state and local levels continue to plague the Emergency Rental
Assistance Program. As of last summer, 89% of that funding had not reached
renters.274
A new program that builds on a preexisting apparatus, as Pandemic EBT (PEBT) does with SNAP, presents additional problems. States failed to deliver food
assistance to children through P-EBT because of various administrative errors.275
Take Tennessee. That state delivered the additional $250 of P-EBT to households
who were already enrolled in SNAP or TANF, but failed to deliver P-EBT to
families not already enrolled in either program.276 Many children are poor enough
to receive free or reduced-price school meals but do not receive SNAP or TANF,
and other children would not be individually eligible for subsidized school meals
but still receive them through school-wide eligibility.277 Failing to navigate these
intricacies, Tennessee botched food assistance to 388,000 children and delayed
approximately $60 million in federal funds.278
States are also better at implementing certain federal programs than others. For
instance, Florida could implement the COVID-related changes to SNAP, including,
unlike Tennessee, direct issuance of P-EBT.279 But Florida’s unemployment
insurance system cratered.280 At a certain point, this level of incompetence betrays
273

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: TRUST FUND SOLVENCY
REPORT (2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/trustFundSolvReport2020.pdf (finding that
22 states were not adequately funding their UI trust funds as of early 2020).
274
Glenn Thrush & Alan Rappeport, About 89% of Rental Assistance Funds Have Not Been
Distributed,
Figures
Show,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
26,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/us/politics/eviction-rental-assistance.html.
275
See generally LESSONS FROM EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PANDEMIC-EBT, supra note 254
(discussing state options in implementing the new program).
276
See, e.g., Natalie Allison, Tennessee Could Forfeit $60M in Federal Food Aid for LowIncome Families During Coronavirus Pandemic, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (July 30, 2020),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/30/tennessee-may-forfeit-60-mpandemic-ebt-funds-applications-stall/5535427002/.
277
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS: COMMUNITY ELIGIBILITY
PROVISION (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/cn/community-eligibility-provision
(describing community eligibility as “allow[ing] the nation’s highest poverty schools and districts
to serve breakfast and lunch at no cost to all enrolled students without collecting household
applications”).
278
See, e.g., Natalie Allison, Tennessee Could Forfeit $60M in Federal Food Aid for LowIncome Families During Coronavirus Pandemic, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (July 30, 2020),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/30/tennessee-may-forfeit-60-mpandemic-ebt-funds-applications-stall/5535427002/; Cathryn Stout, As deadline for summer P-EBT
eligibility looms, Tennessee addresses delays, CHALKBEAT TENNESSEE (July 30, 2021),
https://tn.chalkbeat.org/2021/7/30/22602547/tennessee-eligible-pebt-application-saturdaysummer-meals.
279
See LESSONS FROM EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PANDEMIC-EBT, supra note 254, at 6 fig.1.
280
Allie Gottlieb, Florida’s Unemployment Insurance System Breaks Down Under COVID-19,
THE REGULATORY REV. (Apr. 28, 2020).
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willfulness. One of Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’s advisors explained that
former Governor Rick Scott’s administration designed the state’s online system for
UI precisely to “make it harder for people to get and keep benefits so the
unemployment numbers were low to give the governor something to brag about.”281
This strategy of bureaucratic disentitlement, by which a lack of capacity, obscure
rules, and unwritten practices subvert statutory commands, has a long history in
social welfare.282 However, it is often difficult to detect whether these problems
reflect the intent of policymakers or simply the complexity of administering public
benefits.
b. Unwilling State Implementation
Second, while some states failed to deliver assistance because of administrative
incompetence, some states failed to deliver assistance because they did not want to
participate in a particular federal policy. For example, 26 states opted out of
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) before the federal government’s
cutoff date of September 6, 2021.283 Even though these weekly enhanced benefits
of $300 were financed by the federal government, states argued they needed to
forego this funding because of a labor shortage.284 So far, there is no evidence that
cutting off unemployment assistance did so.285 Yet, the consequences for people in
need are stunning. Take Texas. That state’s decision to cut off PUA last June meant
Texas relinquished roughly $6.5 billion in federal funding, which impacted almost
a million workers—of whom 767,000 lost all UI benefits.286
For food assistance, some states decided not to renew emergency declarations
in 2021, which cut off SNAP recipients in their states from receiving additional
benefits.287 Furthermore, twelve states also opted out of continuing Pandemic EBT,
281
Gary Fineout & Marc Caputo, ‘It’s a sh—sandwich’: Republicans rage as Florida becomes
a
nightmare
for
Trump,
POLITICO
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2020/04/03/its-a-sh-sandwich-republicans-rage-asflorida-becomes-a-nightmare-for-trump-1271172.
282
See Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC.
SERV. REV. 3, 3 (1984) (defining bureaucratic disentitlement as the process by which “obligations
to social welfare beneficiaries are reduced and circumscribed through largely obscure ‘bureaucratic’
actions and inactions of public authorities”).
283
THE CENTURY FOUND., WORKERS PREMATURELY CUT OFF, (Sept. 26, 2021),
https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/tcf.data/viz/WorkersPrematurelyCutoff/_4_3_workers_prem
ature_cutoff.
284
See, e.g., Iowa to end participation in federal unemployment benefit programs, OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA KIM REYNOLDS, (May 11, 2021), https://governor.iowa.gov/pressrelease/iowa-to-end-participation-in-federal-unemployment-benefit-programs%C2%A0citingstrong.
285
Sarah Chaney Cambon & Danny Dougherty, States That Cut Unemployment Benefits Saw
Limited Impact on Job Growth, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2021).
286
WORKERS PREMATURELY CUT OFF, supra note 283.
287
See, e.g., Laura Reiley, Some states are cutting off emergency food-assistance programs and
making it harder to qualify, WASHINGTON POST (June 18, 2021); Grant Schulte, Ricketts Stands by
Decision to Discontinue Emergency SNAP, A.P. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-
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denying additional food assistance to children.288 Florida refused to apply for the
Summer 2021 funding for Pandemic EBT for months, delaying an additional $820
million in federal funds for approximately 2.7 million children.289
These refusals and delays by state officials to draw down federal funds intended
for poor residents are not new. Indeed, many of the states that refused to extend
pandemic-related assistance are also states that chose not to participate in the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, even though the federal government
pays nearly all of the state’s costs for the first ten years.290 Still, the fact that so
many states have willfully rejected federal funding to support its poorest residents
should inform our thinking on how to adapt welfare programs for climate change.
c. The Racialized Hierarchy of the Pandemic Response
The third reason the public benefits response to the COVID-19 pandemic was
so uneven is that relying on preexisting programs to deliver assistance perpetuates
the racial hierarchy of the American welfare state. Southern states continue to deny
federal assistance for their poorest residents, who are disproportionately Black and
Latino.291 Meanwhile, the default arrangement of federal-state cooperation leaves
out millions, especially immigrants, people in the five territories, and tribal
members.
Although Congress expanded Medicaid for COVID-19-related coverage for
testing and treatment, it chose not to cover undocumented immigrants or all workers
in health care settings, including home healthcare workers.292 Even racial and ethnic
minorities who were covered were turned away from testing and care.293
outbreak-pete-ricketts-omaha-nebraska-archive-dfb8da0712f6f4cb9307412049ab29a2.
288
FOOD & NUTRIT. SERV., SY 2020-2021 STATE GUIDANCE ON CORONAVIRUS P-EBT (Sept.
17, 2021), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/state-guidance-coronavirus-pandemic-ebt-pebt-sy20-21.
289
Lisa Marie Garza, After delay, Florida applies for federal pandemic food aid for low-income
families,
ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(Sept.
26,
2021)
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/education/os-ne-florida-pandemic-food-stampsapplication-children-20210925-efpwlip3wrbkzlvjwvy3hm7pue-story.html.
290
See Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not
Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/.
291
See Kelly Whitener et al., Expanding Medicaid Would Help Close Coverage Gap for Latino
Children and Parents, GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMS. (June 2021),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Expanding-Medicaid-Would-Help-CloseCoverage-Gap-for-Latino-Children-and-Parents.pdf (relating that in Texas, 41% of Latino parents
and almost 18% of Latino children are uninsured—higher than any other state); Alana Semuels,
States With Large Black Populations Are Stingier With Government Benefits, THE ATLANTIC (June
6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/race-safety-net-welfare/529203.
292
Andrew Donlan, ‘I Deserve to Be Respected’: Home Care Workers Make Emotional Plea
for Better Treatment, HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://homehealthcarenews.com/2020/04/i-deserve-to-be-respected-home-care-workers-makeemotional-plea-for-better-treatment/.
293
Sheila Selman, Company Apologizes for Discrimination Against Latinos at Goshen COVID19 Testing Site, GOSHEN NEWS (July 3, 2020); Lynn Bonner, State Adviser: Some NC Latinos Sick
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Additionally, racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately employed as
essential workers, with Black Americans most likely to be categorized as frontline
or essential workers.294 These workers were the most likely to be exposed to
COVID-19 in the workplace.295
This racism and xenophobia in the federal and state governments’ pandemic
response extended beyond the public benefit context.296 Some states have denied
undocumented immigrants access to vaccines297 or required identification in order
to be vaccinated.298 In March 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott blamed, without
evidence, an increase in COVID-19 infections on undocumented immigrants from
Mexico.299 Alex Azar, President Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services,
stated publicly that disparities in COVID-19 infections and deaths among Latinos
may be associated with their culture.300
This hierarchy also manifested in the stingier assistance provided to territories
and tribes. While Congress made some efforts to mirror the public benefit
expansions for states, territories and tribes still received significantly less
assistance. For instance, Congress did authorize additional nutrition assistance for
CNMI, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa, the three territories that federal law
excludes from SNAP.301 Yet, none of these territories benefited from the emergency
with COVID-19 Are Sent Home from Hospitals, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 16, 2020).
294
BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY (July 30, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm; Devan Hawkins, The coronavirus
burden is falling heavily on black Americans. Why?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/16/black-workers-coronavirus-covid-19.
295
See Ruqaijjah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, The Government’s Pandemic
Response, and Racial Inequities in COVID-19, 70 EMORY L.J. 1419, 1463–65 (2021).
296
In the South, a majority of vaccine allocation sites were placed in predominantly white
neighborhoods. Sean McMinn et al., Across the South COVID-19 Vaccine Sites Missing from Black
and
Hispanic
Neighborhoods,
NPR
(Feb.
5
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/05/962946721/across-the-south-covid-19-vaccine-sites-missingfrom-black-and-hispanic-neighbor.
297
William Saletan, The GOP’s Foolish Campaign Against Vaccinating Undocumented
Immigrants, SLATE (March 9, 2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/republicanscovid-vaccines-undocumented-immigrants-lies.html.
298
Akilah Johnson, For Immigrants, IDs Prove To Be a Barrier To a Dose of Protection, WASH.
POST (Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/04/10/covid-vaccineimmigrants-id/.
299
Noah Higgins-Dunn, Texas Gov. Abbott Blames Covid Spread on Immigrants, Criticizes
Biden’s ‘Neanderthal’ Comment, CNBC (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/04/texasgov-abbott-blames-covid-spread-on-immigrants-criticizes-bidens-neanderthal-comment-.html.
300
Sarah Westwood & Sunlen Serfaty, HHS Secretary Tells Lawmakers Lifestyles of MeatProcessing Plant Employees Worsened Covid-19 Outbreak, CNN (May 7, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/07/politics/alex-azar-meat-processing-plants/index.html.
301
See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 1102, 2302(a)(1),
134 Stat. 178, 180, 188; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 1103(b), 135 Stat.
4, 16. These three territories normally receive a block grant of funding as opposed to the entitlement
funding enjoyed by the rest of the United States. See Hammond, Territorial Exceptionalism, supra
note 31, at 1669-72 (discussing the exclusion of these territories from safety net programs including
SNAP).
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allotments or increased benefits to SNAP outlined earlier.302 Furthermore,
Congress places funding caps on territorial Medicaid.303 Before the pandemic hit,
this funding cap limited Puerto Rico to providing only ten of Medicaid’s seventeen
mandatory services.304 Congress did make additional Medicaid funding available,
but at a percentage lower than that in the states.305 The most significant step
Congress took to treat Americans in the territories on par with their fellow
Americans in the fifty states was by expanding Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance (PUA) to the entire country.306
Tribes received funding from Congress to provide access to testing and
treatment, but many people living on reservations or land trusts,307 especially tribal
members and Alaska Native people, lacked access due to decades of disinvestment
in health infrastructure.308 Additionally, the CARES funding money was initially
only disbursed to health-care facilities on reservations and other land trusts, leaving
Native peoples who did not reside there without access to testing and treatment.309
Moreover, the 200 tribes that are not recognized by the United States did not receive
any federal assistance during the pandemic.310
Considering the pandemic response, there are at least three insights for efforts
302
See BRYNNE KEITH JENNINGS & ELIZABETH WOLKOMIR, HOW DOES HOUSEHOLD FOOD
ASSISTANCE IN PUERTO RICO COMPARE TO THE REST OF THE UNITED STATES?, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/how
-does-household-food-assistance-in-puerto-rico-compare-to-the-rest-of.
303
42 U.S.C. § 1308(b)(1) (laying out the Medicaid annual grant formula for the territories);
see, e.g., KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID FINANCING CLIFF: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEMS IN PUERTO RICO AND USVI, (May 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/medicaid-financing-cliff-implications-for-the-health-care-systems-in-puerto-rico-and-usvi/.
304
See Fact Sheet: Medicaid and CHIP in Puerto Rico, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS
COMM’N, (2020), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Medicaid-and-CHIP-inPuerto-Rico.pdf.
305
See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
These actions raised American Samoa’s FY 2020 allotment from $12.4 million to $86.3 million and
its FY 2021 allotment from approximately $12.7 million to $85.6 million. See CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF11012, MEDICAID FINANCING FOR THE TERRITORIES 1 (2020).
306
JOHN PALLASCH, ASST. SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY LTR. NO. 16-20 TO STATE
WORKFORCE
AGENCIES,
UNEMPLOYMENT
INSUR.
PROG.
(Apr.
5,
2020),
https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_16-20.pdf (relaying that the PUA “program is
available in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, [and] CNMI”).
307
Id.
308
Talha Burki, COVID-19 among American Indians and Alaska Natives, 21 THE LANCET 325
(2021); see also Katherine Florey, Toward Tribal Regulatory Sovereignty in the Wake of the Covid19 Pandemic, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 399 (2021) (discussing the ways in which Supreme Court doctrine
interfered with tribal governance in public health emergencies).
309
Casey Kuhn, Why indigenous people in cities feel ‘invisible’ as pandemic wears on, PBS
NEWS HOUR (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/why-indigenous-people-incities-feel-invisible-as-pandemic-wears-on.
310
Eilis O’Neill, Unrecognized Tribes Struggle Without Federal Aid During Pandemic, NPR
(Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/17/988123599/unrecognized-tribes-strugglewithout-federal-aide-during-pandemic.
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to adapt welfare programs to meet the climate crisis. First, Congress and the federal
government can mitigate suffering for millions of Americans through existing
programs. Second, reliance on preexisting programs, many of which rely on some
state and local role, almost guarantees that the distribution of assistance will be
uneven, and some elected officials at the state level will forego millions and billions
of federal funds intended for their residents. Third, these preexisting programs are
encoded with a racial hierarchy that ensures that people in some states, immigrants
in all states, people in the five territories, and tribal members receive less assistance.
Combining these insights from the COVID-19 pandemic with the earlier
discussions about the challenges of Congressional capacity and state responses, the
next and final Part focuses on what federal, state, and local governments can do to
improve individual access to public benefits in light of the climate crisis.
IV. ADAPTING WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS
This century will be one of fitful and then rapid transformation to adapt to life
on an increasingly hostile planet. Where we live, how we work, how we move, and
what we consume will change. Among these countless changes will be how our
government responds to those who have been displaced and those whose
livelihoods have been destroyed by our changing climate. This Part sketches
possible adaptations in public benefits that will help Americans weather the
wildfires and storms made more devastating by the climate crisis.
Before getting into the details, though, it is worth addressing a scholarly
criticism of these prescriptions—a criticism that, frankly, can be leveled at most
legal scholarship that calls for government action. Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have identified an “inside/outside fallacy” endemic to public law
scholarship.311 According to them, this scholarship offers “deeply pessimistic
accounts of the ambitious, partisan, or self-interested motives of relevant actors in
the legal system” only to then “turn around and issue an optimistic proposal for
public-spirited solutions.”312 For a few reasons, Posner and Vermeule’s critique is
less persuasive here.
First, this Article predicts that policymaking on climate adaptation will align
with how Congress operates.313 If members of Congress are “single-minded
reelection seekers,” then the increasing prevalence of climate-fueled disasters will
create such consistent constituent and electoral pressure that representatives will
need to respond.314 In that way, the proposals that follow recognize those incentives
311

Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743,

(2013).
312

Id. at 1745; see also, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CAL. L. REV. 985,
1054 (2017) (agreeing that “policymakers generally work within, the limitations it imposes on new
policy, and legal scholars’ tendency to ignore those limitations”).
313
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 311, at 1763.
314
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); see. also Jamie L.
Carson & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time, 14 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 25, 27 (2011) (describing “Mayhew’s notion of the electoral incentive” as “the theoretical
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and build on them.315 Many of the proposals that follow would be, from the
perspective of individual members of Congress, cheap to implement, including
flexibility for applications by the elderly and people with disabilities or longer
eligibility windows for counties where infrastructure has yet to get back online. For
the Article’s more costly proposals, social science suggests that the expansion of
welfare programs, with its particularized benefits and diffuse costs, may be more
politically feasible than subsequent retrenchment.316
While it is useful to tether policy proposals to political realities, the previous
Parts have shown that the breadth of the climate crisis has begun to create new
exigencies—ones that demands national action. Scholars have repeatedly
concluded that crises help induce legislative and regulatory change.317 Indeed, as
Part III.C documents, the governmental response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
while flawed, demonstrates that even in its current state, Congress can legislate
quickly and comprehensively to help Americans meet basic needs during a national
emergency. This Part simply applies those lessons from the pandemic response to
the climate context.
Finally, some challenges, like the twin crises of the pandemic and our changing
climate, are so massive that smaller scale responses cannot replace national action.
Sudden societal and political change may come sooner than some might think. Mass
mobilization will create a “policy window” for renewed efforts to address climatecaused displacement and devastation.318 The choice is whether legal scholars
should submit to the status quo or rather work toward new law when the status quo
begins to fall apart.319 This Article chooses the latter.
foundation for much of the contemporary research examining the U.S. Congress”).
315
See, e.g., Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 71, 139 (2016) (making similar proposals).
316
See PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE
POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 131-63 (1994).
317
See KINGDON, supra note 190, at 90–115; Daniel Carpenter & Jisela Sin, Policy, Tragedy,
and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 149, 153 (2007) (“The claim that regulation follows certain critical events (either actual events
or journalistic exposes) is common to historians of numerous fields of regulation.”); see also Gabriel
Scheffler, The Dynamism of Health Law: Expanded Insurance Coverage as the Engine of
Regulatory Reform, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 729, 771-73 (2020) (collecting examples of crises that
led to an increased government role including in the context of financial regulation, health law,
consumer law, and environmental law). But see Peter Conti-Brown & Brian D. Feinstein, The
Contingent Origins of Financial Legislation, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 145, 212 (2021) (canvassing
various case studies and concluding that financial crises are not a necessary precondition for
financial reform).
318
See KINGDON, supra note 190, at 20; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 136–37 (2016) (arguing that the history of American
law suggests that mobilization is “a valuable political resource” for “the nonwealthy and other
disenfranchised groups”).
319
For the latter, see Amna A. Akbar et al., Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 883 (2021)
(criticizing much of public-facing legal scholarship for “further[ing] a form of political austerity
that devastates poor and working-class people by foreclosing real change”); Austin Sarat & Susan
Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL’Y 97, 98 (1988) (making similar
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Specifically, the proposals below seek to strengthen our federal and state
welfare law in ways that make public benefits more reliable, accessible, and
portable. First, poor people’s access to these programs should not depend on the
vagaries of politics on Capitol Hill or in the statehouses. Instead, policymakers
should decide ex ante who should receive what benefits before a climate-fueled
disaster strikes. Second, these programs should be accessible to all people in need,
not just people who can wait in line for eight hours. Third, these benefits should not
vanish at a state’s borders but rather should travel with the people in need. In
attempting to instantiate these principles, the proposals below include changes to
federal law as well as state and local adaptations.
A. Retrofitting Existing Federal Programs
This Section explains how the federal government could improve state and local
government access to disaster welfare programs. In many ways, these proposals
identify ways in which the United States can retrofit existing programs to better
respond to climate-fueled disasters. Specifically, federal law should be revised in
three respects to make assistance more reliable, accessible, and portable.
First, Congress should legislate in ways that additional funding kicks in
automatically after disasters as opposed to waiting on future Congresses to make
emergency appropriations. As discussed in Part III, Congress is finding it
increasingly difficult to enact legislation and appropriate funds, sometimes
delaying assistance by months or even a year. This reality of national lawmaking
has dire consequences for a country that will continue to experience more frequent
and more intense storms, fires, and floods. As a result, Congress should identify
mechanisms that allow federal, state, and local governments to respond to surges
in need without relying on the weaknesses and whims of the current Congress. The
best way to do so is to legislate automatic stabilizers.320 For instance, Congress
could amend the Food and Nutrition Act to allow states to automatically issue
replacement and supplemental SNAP benefits following a major disaster
declaration. Making these additional benefits automatic would help us avoid the
odd result of people who were poor before the storm receiving less food assistance
than their neighbors who receive D-SNAP after the storm.321 Congress could amend
the Internal Revenue Code to allow EITC recipients to use all of their prior year’s

observations about sociolegal scholarship).
320
Here again, the COVID-19 pandemic is instructive. One recent study suggests that during
the COVID-19 pandemic, only SNAP and UI functioned as automatic stabilizers, whereas other
safety net programs “showed little buoyancy to economic downturns over the last two decades.”
Robert Moffitt & James P. Ziliak, COVID-19 and the U.S. Safety Net (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27911, 2021), https://voxeu.org/article/how-covid-19-making-us-rethinksafety-net-programmes.
321
DISASTER SNAP GUIDANCE, supra note 91, at 35 (identifying supplemental benefits as
“provid[ing] parity between new D-SNAP households and ongoing clients, who are not eligible for
D-SNAP benefits”).
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income to claim the EITC in the year of a disaster.322 Congress could make similar
changes so that the Social Security Administration could automatically advance
payments for the elderly and people with disabilities who live in a disaster area.
Congress could also rely on multiple metrics from agencies with scientific expertise
like EPA or NOAA to identify when states can issue additional food assistance to
children following climate-induced school closures.323
Second, federal law should make it easier for vulnerable Americans, like
children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, to access benefits. Given how
much our society relies on schools to feed children, Congress should extend
Pandemic EBT to households with children in major disaster areas. Just as the
COVID-19 pandemic closed schools, so too will wildfires and hurricanes. In both
crises, school districts must prevent children from attending out of concern for their
health, whether due to a deadly novel virus like COVID-19 or contaminated air.324
Considering that one in four children in the United States have at least one foreignborn parent, Congress should revisit exclusions of non-citizens from certain
disaster welfare provisions.325 In light of their vulnerabilities to contaminated air
and extreme heat, Congress should also make it easier for the elderly and people
with disabilities to access assistance, whether through pre-registration and online
or telephonic applications.
Third, federal law should allow assistance to follow Americans displaced by
climate-fueled disasters. Federal relief should not stumble at state borders that no
storm respects. Congress should amend various statutes, or alternatively, the
relevant federal agencies should promulgate regulations or issue guidance that
allow assistance to follow Americans who must cross state lines. Federal law should
require or at least allow state agencies to accept and honor applications and existing
benefits from another state. Following Hurricane Katrina, the relevant federal
agency allowed individuals to use Louisiana WIC vouchers in any state to purchase
diapers, infant formula, and food.326 The U.S. Department of Agriculture could
promulgate a legislative rule that makes this practice available for any American
322

See COVID-19 Earned Income Act, S. 3542 & H.R. 6762, 116th Cong. (2020); NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, PROVIDE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) RELIEF DURING NATIONAL
DISASTERS,
PURPLE
BOOK
(2021),
https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/ARC20_PurpleBook_08_MiscRecs_54.pdf.
323
See Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 487 (2017) (observing
that the production of high-quality information is “the bureaucracy’s raison d’etre”).
324
See
CDC,
WILDFIRE
SMOKE
AND
CHILDREN
(May
4,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/air/wildfire-smoke/children.htm; Stephanie M. Holm et al., Health effects of
wildfire smoke in children and public health tools: a narrative review, 31 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENV’T
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41370-020-00267-4.pdf (identifying
November 15, 2018 as the single-day record of school closures due to wildfires when over a million
children in California had classes cancelled).
325
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRANT FAMILIES (BY AGE GROUP AND
STATE, 1990 VERSUS 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/childrenimmigrant-families.
326
CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL FOOD ASSISTANCE IN DISASTERS: HURRICANES KATRINA AND
RITA 5 (updated Feb. 23, 2006), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33102/3.
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whose permanent address is in a major disaster area. Similarly, states should be
able to honor Medicaid benefits from other states. Of course, the challenge would
be the extent to which the receiving state takes on additional, unexpected costs.
However, those challenges would be minimal for benefits like SNAP in which the
federal government finances 100% of the benefits. For programs like Medicaid
where states contribute significant funding, the federal government could similarly
cover those additional costs by raising the federal match for new arrivals. Indeed,
there is proposed legislation to do just that. During the last Congress, legislation
was introduced in both the House and Senate that would allow individuals forced
to relocate to another state as a result of a major disaster to continue to access
Medicaid with the federal government covering the entire cost.327
Relatedly, in light of the challenges Americans face in accessing assistance,
they should be able to enforce federal and state law by suing the relevant agencies.
Congress should amend the Stafford Act to permit Americans to sue FEMA for
violations of federal law. As Part III shows, poor people have used litigation to
secure meaningful relief from state welfare agencies following major disasters.
Making FEMA liable for its administration of disaster benefits creates opportunities
for remedial orders following disasters and may discipline the federal agency to
avoid litigation in the future. Furthermore, the U.S. should no longer rely on a
volunteer, ABA-led effort or alternatively for state bars or courts to approve outof-state attorneys via “Katrina Rules” to provide crucial legal services to people in
need after disasters.328 Rather, Congress should provide additional funding to the
Legal Services Corporation so that grantee organizations can hire and train legal
services attorneys who are already admitted to practice in the relevant state as well
as consider revisiting restrictions on LSC-funded organizations to the extent that
they impede this area of practice.
To be sure, some of these proposals will be costly to the federal government.
But the climate crisis will put increased pressure on government spending
regardless of these changes. In the last thirty years, the federal government’s
appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund, when adjusted for inflation, have
increased ten-fold.329 And there will be other massive costs associated with climate
change.330 The question is not whether government will have to devote more and
327
Disaster Relief Medicaid Act, H.R. 3215, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); S. 1754, 116th Cong.
(2019–2020).
328
See Ballard et al., supra note 133, at 5–6 (describing how New York legal aid attorneys
“faced a steep learning curve in new legal issues to adequately advise Sandy victims” and the
“peculiarities of advocating for their clients’ appropriate disaster recovery benefits”).
329
Jeff Stein & Andrew Van Dam, Taxpayer spending on U.S. disaster fund explodes amid
climate
change,
population
trends,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
22,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/04/22/taxpayer-spending-us-disaster-fundexplodes-amid-climate-change-population-trends/.
330
For instance, Congress and the Pentagon will need to decide what to do with the Naval
Station Norfolk, the country’s (and the world’s) largest naval base. Carolyn Beeler, What it might
take to protect the world's biggest naval base from rising seas, THE WORLD (June 23, 2016),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-23/what-it-might-take-protect-worlds-biggest-naval-base-
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more resources to adapt to the climate crisis, but what adaptations the government
will prioritize. Future lawmakers will be forced to make difficult choices. If the past
is any guide, though, Congress will continue to appropriate funding after extreme
weather events to meet people’s basic needs. These suggestions offer ways to make
that process more equitable and effective.
B. State and Local Adaptation to Improve Individual Access
As this Article demonstrates, there are structural reasons why states struggle to
meet surges in need. The proposals above suggest how the federal government
could be more responsive in helping state and local governments respond in the
wake of extreme weather events. But there is a distinct possibility that Congress
does not do enough to adapt welfare programs to meet the climate crisis. In other
words, it is worth considering what states should do in the absence of meaningful
national action.331
First, states should develop policies and practices to make assistance more
reliable. For instance, states can develop pre-registration systems so that people
with limited mobility need not apply in person for services. States should follow
the lead of Louisiana and explore how to allow people to register for assistance
before a storm strikes.332 States should also identify ways to move human services
personnel from unaffected areas in their state to impacted areas that need additional
support.333
Absent federal leadership, states, territories, and tribes could also create
working groups to identify best practices in adapting public benefit programs for
the climate crisis. States, territories, and tribes could engage in interstate compacts
that would allow them to send caseworkers and other social services personnel to
help other states in need. These kinds of ad hoc arrangements among states occurred
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.334 As the climate crisis intensifies, it will
become harder for a state to volunteer its own personnel to another state, lest it
deprive its own agencies of the resources it needs to respond to a climate-fueled
disaster within its borders. But interstate compacts among states that tend to
experience these extreme weather events at different points in the year could
continue well into the next decade.
Second, states should continue to take advantage of any flexibility in federal
rising-seas.
331
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law to make these programs more accessible. States should routinely file for federal
waivers to improve individual access to these benefits. Specifically, states should
seek to waive in-person application requirements for those individuals who cannot
be reasonably expected to do so, such as the elderly or people with disabilities, and
in those areas where the state’s own offices are severely damaged.335 States can also
consider asking for longer eligibility windows in case some parts of the state are
slow to implement disaster services.336 As recoveries drag on, receiving states will
need to figure out ways to streamline applications for these new residents.
Differences in eligibility among states will most likely create additional
administrative burdens to applicants and bureaucrats alike.
C. Toward A New Safety Net for the Climate Crisis
While some state and local governments will employ a variety of strategies to
meet surges in need, others may seek to deny entry or assistance to new arrivals
from other states or the territories. Indeed, as Part III showed with state responses
to the pandemic, it appears that some states are willing to forego federal assistance
to their own residents.337 This kind of state governance could have severe
implications as it is likely that internal displacement in the United States and
elsewhere will become an ever-present social phenomenon. Importantly, there is
dusty but durable Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the Constitution
prohibits a state from barring poor people from crossing its borders or seeking
services.338 Indeed, precisely because of that possibility, it will be crucial that
people seeking assistance have access to attorneys who have the expertise necessary
to challenge these practices. Regardless of whether volunteer junior attorneys were
the appropriate way to deliver disaster legal services in years past, such an
arrangement seems woefully inadequate for the increased demand and legal
complexities that will arise during the climate crisis. Yet, even if there are attorneys
able to represent poor people and precedent upon which those lawyers can rely,
states will experiment with various policy and practices that will, in turn, test that
doctrine anew.
Congress could head off these punitive state practices by equalizing benefit
levels across states and shouldering more of the costs. Congress could do so by
replacing some of the fiscal federalism of these programs or by funding the services
for people newly arrived in the receiving state, as suggested above. Yet, these
concerns about uneven and unwilling state implementation of assistance are likely
to persist. In that way, this Article lends additional support to those who have
argued that a new cash-based benefit like a universal basic income (UBI) would
335
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avoid these structural pitfalls. And perhaps the ways in which the federal
government seemed willing to provide cash assistance in the COVID-19 response
suggests a political opening—though we should wait to see whether the current
Congress decides to make some of these changes permanent. Furthermore, moving
away from state-based aid would also benefit people who are often excluded from
that cooperative federalism including immigrants, people in the territories, and
tribal members.
Nonetheless, what these climate-fueled disasters teach us is that while statebased aid may be structurally deficient, in-kind aid, like food distribution and
temporary housing, will still be necessary. If retail food stores are unavailable and
people’s homes are destroyed, government will need to find ways to feed and house
survivors in ways that do not rely on cash or quasi-cash benefits. As a result, it is
unlikely that even a nationalized safety net, whether through existing, retrofitted
programs, like SNAP, or a universal one, like UBI, will negate the need for in-kind
assistance in the coming years.
CONCLUSION
All of us must adapt to Earth’s rapidly changing climate. We will also judge
our government’s ability to do so. Considering how the United States has relied on
its public benefit programs to respond to fires and floods in the past, it is likely that
the United States will continue to use these programs to respond to people displaced
and impoverished by climate-fueled disasters. To do that effectively, the United
States will need to adapt these programs in myriad ways. This Article provides a
roadmap for such new and strange terrain.
***

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4232439

